Jim Headley: Chechnya's poison spreads

COMMENT

In the wake of the horrendous events in Beslan, it is difficult to write a dispassionate analysis of the crisis facing Russia.

But this was not an isolated incident: the conflict in Chechnya has lasted for more than a decade, terrorist acts have intensified in the past two years and have been particularly devastating in the past fortnight.

The recent horrific events have met with universal international condemnation.

But, unfortunately, we can expect more atrocities, even though they do nothing to promote the Chechen cause and risk wider regional and international repercussions.

Some small scope for progress towards a political solution can be identified, but the initial responses of the Russian authorities suggest it is minimal.

Some people have suggested that the willingness of the hostage-takers to seize and kill children shows how desperate the Chechens must be.

This ignores the fact that it will have repulsed most of the population of Chechnya itself.

On the part of some of those involved, such as the so-called black widow suicide bombers, it may reflect immense personal despair and anger at Russian actions within Chechnya.

These actions, on the whole, are the marks of extreme fanaticism rather than despair. But what kind of fanaticism?

Since 1999, when two apartment blocks were destroyed by bombs and Chechen rebels seized villages in the neighbouring Russian republic of Dagestan, Russian authorities led by President Vladimir Putin have claimed Russia is being attacked by international terrorism.

In his address to the nation on Saturday, Putin again declared that they were dealing with the direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia.

The substance of the claim is that the terrorists are trained and financed from abroad and often include militants from elsewhere (10 of the hostage-takers at Beslan are said to have been from the Middle East).

With this rhetoric, Russia aims to get international support as a frontline state in the civilised world's war against terrorism.

After September 11, the official Russian interpretation gained some acceptance abroad. It has now been formalised in the United Nations Security Council statement last week which condemned the attacks in Russia and referred to the resolution passed in September 2001 after the terror strikes in the US.

Undoubtedly there are links between Chechen rebels and outside terrorist groups and Islamic fundamentalists, including al Qaeda.

An external group calling itself the Islambouli Brigades has claimed responsibility for last week's suicide bombing in Moscow and for blowing up the two aircraft in which 89 people died, in terms of fighting the Russian infidel, but its claim has not been substantiated.

The most likely perpetrator of the Beslan hostage-taking was the Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs, ultimately led by Shamil Basayev, who claimed responsibility for the seizure of the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow in October 2002.

In the first war in Chechnya from 1994-96, Basayev was a field commander who increasingly used such shock actions, and also increasingly developed Islamist leanings, and who now aims to establish an Islamic state across the north Caucasus.

His fighters and suicide bombers do receive training and financial support from Islamic fundamentalist groups outside Russia.

Russian authorities are right, then, to point to a link with Islamic fanaticism.

Yet, there are contradictions in the Russian statements which reveal another truth.

Although they label it a fight against international terrorism, they insist this is an internal matter for Russia. In other words, they accept it is connected to the Chechen conflict.

As well, Russian spokespeople, including Putin, refer synonymously to terrorists and separatists, thereby implicitly acknowledging the presence of another fanaticism: ethno-nationalist separatism.

Nationalist separatists are prepared to use force to pursue their aims, including terrorist attacks against civilians, in many places around the world.

The situation in the north Caucasus is also comparable in some respects to Israel-Palestine, where Islamic fanaticism is linked to ethno-nationalist political aims.

And, without endorsing the view that despair impels, let alone justifies, individuals to commit horrific terrorist acts, in both cases the present catastrophe is partly the state's own creation.

In Chechnya, Russian tactics over the past decade - the use of detention camps, disappearances, the virtual destruction of Grozny, the day-to-day brutality and corruption of the Russian forces - have provoked further radicalism and fanaticism.

The crisis in Chechnya began as a political struggle over the status of Chechnya as the Soviet Union broke up, between separatists who wanted it to become an independent state, and Russian authorities who wanted it to remain part of the Russian Federation. It is partly because of the brutal suppression of the separatist movement that Chechen separatists have looked outside for support and adopted a more extreme ideology.

War breeds extremism; it also breeds crime, and one of the obstacles to peace in Chechnya is the interest that criminal groups have in prolonging the crisis.

Putin has declared that terrorists will not intimidate the Russian people into surrendering, allowing them to destroy and split Russia, and has reaffirmed his commitment to defending the country's territorial integrity.

Indeed, he has no choice: no Russian leader can be seen to give in to terrorism, or to allow Chechnya to become independent, especially after so many years of war.

Putin himself rose to power avowing to regain control over Chechnya and to bring security to Russia.

On the latter count, he has clearly failed; and in Chechnya, although he has declared a military victory, attacks on Russian troops continue, and the pro-Moscow President was assassinated in May.

Now all of Russia feels insecure. Putin has declared that a more effective security system must be created, able to cope with crises of the kind witnessed in the past weeks, and to prevent them from occurring.

Unfortunately, this is a major task which requires confronting a problem endemic to Russian society: corruption.

Terrorists are able to bribe their way through checkpoints across the region and even to Moscow.

Putin is also talking of external security: securing the external borders of the Russian Federation and perhaps acting beyond the borders to cut off support to terrorists and separatists.

In this context, it is significant that last week's Security Council statement urged all states to co-operate actively with the Russian authorities in their efforts to find and bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of these terrorist acts.

Already this year Russian security services appear to have carried out the assassination of a Chechen separatist leader in Qatar, and over the past few years they have made incursions into Georgia in search of Chechen guerrillas.

If the Russian authorities now perceive a state to be harbouring terrorists, or groups supporting or training terrorists, they may escalate their actions (it is ominous that Putin spoke of "some people wanting to cut off a juicy morsel from us while others are helping them, wanting to weaken Russia").

Russian forces, then, may act elsewhere in the region, and even beyond, with unpredictable regional and international consequences.

But the status of Chechnya remains the core issue. Putin is under pressure from the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the human rights watchdog OSCE, to begin a political process: he retorts that he has done this already and that he will not deal with terrorists.

But the political process is flawed. Last year's referendum on a new constitution for Chechnya granting it substantial autonomy within the Russian Federation was by no means free, nor was the recent presidential election.

A more inclusive political process is necessary, and this may involve talking to hard-line secessionists.

It takes a major step to talk to terrorists, but sometimes that step needs to be taken (Northern Ireland is a good example).

Such forces exist, in exile, represented by Aslan Maskhadov, who was President when Chechnya had de facto independence from 1996 to 1999, and his spokesman in London, Akhmed Zakayev.

Russia accuses Britain of harbouring a terrorist and resists calls to talk to Maskhadov by arguing that the US would not talk to al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

But this illustrates the problem with forcing all the complex dimensions of the Chechen conflict into the label "war against international terrorism". Although Maskhadov has looked to Islamists for support, he is fundamentally a Chechen nationalist. And he has dissociated himself from terrorist attacks on civilians.

Maskhadov has previously declared a willingness to begin talks with Russian representatives on a possible solution by which Chechnya would remain part of Russia, but would have a high degree of autonomy, and no Russian troops would be based there.

With international mediation, and international monitoring, a feasible agreement could be devised.

But Russia refuses to allow international involvement in its internal affairs; European influence is weak; and the Bush Administration appears to regard Maskhadov as the Chechen Yasser Arafat.

Although it is true he lost control of the region when he was President, and was sidelined by extremists, this was partly because there was no real political framework, the republic was devastated, and got no support from Russia.

It is also true that such a political framework would be rejected by extremists, (nationalist and religious), and terrorism would continue.

But most Chechens want peace. They would most likely accept autonomy within Russia if it did not come in the form of Russian occupation, and involved real reconstruction.

And Russians as a whole want real security and a real end to the Chechen conflicts, which Putin has promised but not yet delivered.

* Dr Jim Headley is a lecturer in Political Studies (Russian politics, ethnic conflict and international security) at Auckland University.