KEY POINTS:
How the Pacific Islands region compares with other parts of the developing world on measures of corruption, sometimes leads to the argument that Pacific Islands states are "cheap to buy".
But which countries support which other ones depends on a range of interests - and each country is looking primarily after its own interests.
There is evidence to support the notion that China has advanced its interests by exploiting regional vulnerabilities. Some of its activities have encouraged corruption and instability in Oceania.
Pacific capitals are now adorned with numerous large civic and public buildings built by China. Some are left partly unfinished and all will require huge amounts of maintenance. Aid money from both Taiwan and China made a significant contribution to the internal politics of crisis-torn Solomon Islands.
However, although China-Taiwan competition was a major issue in the domestic politics of Kiribati in 2003, that country remains one of the most stable in the region. This new Government based on democratic principles demonstrated its strength when it terminated the relationship with Beijing, despite the supposed strategic significance of China's satellite tracking facility on its capital atoll of Tarawa.
Often local resentment against new Chinese migrants to Oceania has to do with China's foreign policy, which sometimes complicates Beijing's attempts to build regional alliances. The early record of atrocious Chinese labour practices at the Ramu Nickel project in Papua New Guinea is not reassuring, and it remains to be seen whether other large-scale China resource ventures will fare any worse with landowner and environmental issues, as major new projects are identified and developed.
Recent aid-leveraged efforts by Western nations to impose comprehensive neo-liberal economic and political reforms have caused resentment among Pacific Islands leaders. It is perhaps understandable that China's alternative development message of 'untied aid', emphasising peaceful coexistence, equality, respect for the social systems and sovereignty of Islands countries, and promising further untied aid has been warmly received.
United States neglect and giving priority to other parts of the world have made Oceania vulnerable to China's increased influence.
Today Washington continues to loom large in Micronesia, while its post-World War II presence south of the equator was never particularly robust, fortunately. Australia, New Zealand, France, Japan and the European Union played the strategic role in the South Pacific.
Nevertheless, better informed and sceptical Islands leaders may wonder about China's various policies, its dubious track record on key issues like global warming and fisheries management, and its lack of commitment to democratic institutions and growing domestic discontent.
As with any foreign power, China's economic impact in the Pacific is uneven, with trade and investment concentrated in places that can supply raw materials. The emphasis on a narrow range of primary exports may inhibit local diversification, and countries with labour-intensive manufacturing industries are finding it difficult to compete with imported Chinese products or export into affluent markets.
A general appetite for trade and natural resources, as well as garnering political support in multi-lateral institutions can explain most of Beijing's recent activities in the region. Although China's rise disturbs a situation where a small number of Western powers previously exercised the overwhelming external regional influence, all of these external powers with interests in the Islands now also have growing economic entanglements with China - and compelling reasons to avoid confrontation.
The Islands are small interests for them compared to what they hope to get from China. Beijing stands apart from this consortium of donors, offering support but asking little beyond recognition of the one China policy. Western powers have no option but to accept that and barring significant setbacks, China is in Oceania to stay. We can do little but urge Beijing to play by the rules established and enforced for decades. It may be the Pacific countries rather than China that ultimately have to compromise.
Much of the debate surrounding China's rise in Oceania invokes the welfare and interests of Island communities. But choices about development objectives, or how to achieve them, should be made by those most invested in the outcome - the Islanders themselves.
A large number of the China corporations have state or political regional backing and extensive industrial policies. Since January 2007, the interim Prime Minister of Fiji has responded to a wide range of opportunities given by China to uphold his interim Government, in the face of sanctions from Australia and New Zealand.
In less than 30 years China has become a world leader in manufacturing and exporting. At least for the moment, China appears to broaden the menu of options for Island states, whose leaders are becoming well accustomed to operating in a world controlled by power players.
* Gilbert Ullrich is chairman of the NZ Pacific Business Council and chief executive officer of Ullrich Aluminium, a major Pacific exporting company.
