Of all the accusations the United States brought against the former regime in Iraq, the possession of biological and chemical weapons was the most credible. After all, Saddam Hussein had used chemicals against Iran and rebellious Kurds in the 1980s. He had not used them in the 1991 Gulf War but nor had he complied with United Nations requests to account for them.
Indeed, the crippling sanctions applied by the UN, which impoverished a once prosperous society and took a high toll in infant mortality, were strictly maintained for 10 years largely at American insistence. So certain was the US of the weapons' existence that UN inspection teams spent years in Iraq on a fruitless search. And so certain the US remained that when it proposed to go to war over the weapons, not even the Governments of France and Germany, which wanted diplomacy to continue, seriously questioned their existence.
This week a dismayed world heard American Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld concede that his forces cannot find any such weapons, do not know what might have happened to them and wonder whether the displaced regime might have destroyed them before the conflict. Why, we could ask, would a desperate and murderous regime do that? If Saddam Hussein had the means to wreak any sort of mass destruction he would probably have used it against the overwhelming forces determined to remove him.
But there are now far more disturbing questions to consider than the behaviour of a displaced tyrant. World stability depends more than ever on the quality of US intelligence, because the present regime is prepared to go to war for "pre-emptive" purposes. It has declared an intention to strike at states that it believes pose a threat or harbour a threat to the US or its citizens. It has made it clear it will not necessarily wait for evidence of a threat, it may act on intelligence. As it did, supposedly, in Iraq.
Was its intelligence of Saddam's weapons simply less categorical than the Bush Administration had made out? Or, worse, are loose intelligence assessments to be simply a pretext for wars against regimes the Administration does not trust. This week, for example, the Pentagon has turned its attention on Iran. Mr Rumsfeld says there are senior al Qaeda operatives in Iran and the country has nuclear intentions.
But both complaints are even more true of Pakistan. Most of the al Qaeda men who evaded capture in Afghanistan are said to be in western Pakistan. And Pakistan is not merely contemplating a nuclear capability, it has one. It has threatened to use it against India. But the difference is that Pakistan's dictator is well-disposed to Washington and Iran's regime on the whole is not.
Every country discriminates between friends and foes, but only the most powerful of countries could dare make war on another simply because it is considered unfriendly. It is not in the interests of international order, and ultimately not in American interests either, that a US Administration should pick fights with foes on the flimsiest of pretexts.
Many will say the pretext for the removal of a murderer such as Saddam Hussein scarcely matters because his end is an unqualified relief. But that will depend on whether the regime that eventually fills the vacuum is a marked improvement. Iraq's political record, ethnic mix, religious tensions and resentment of an occupying power are not encouraging.
People under oppressive regimes are more likely to welcome foreign intervention when it comes with just cause. That usually means it is a timely response to a transgression of accepted international behaviour. So far the White House has failed to establish its stated cause for war and, worse, it seems not to care.
Herald Feature: Iraq
Iraq links and resources
<I>Editorial:</I> World at risk from lack of intelligence
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