KEY POINTS:
A new Labour Department investigation has concluded that "on the balance of probabilities" a strain of meningococcal disease that nearly killed a visiting scientist was likely to have resulted from her work in an Environmental Science and Research laboratory. It is about time. By any yardstick, it was always highly likely that Jeannette Adu-Bobie contracted meningitis while researching the disease in a Wellington antibody testing unit. Yet it has taken three years for officials to admit as much. Even after Dr Adu-Bobie had to have both her legs, an arm and some fingers on her remaining hand amputated, their impulse was to deny the most obvious explanation. They deserve every bit of the ignominy now heaped upon them.
Dr Adu-Bobie, a British expert on meningococcal bacteria, was employed by Chiron Vaccines, which makes the vaccine used to immunise New Zealand children. She had been in this country only 20 days and at the ESR for seven working days when she contracted the disease. The chances of a woman in her 30s and living by herself picking it up through contact with the community in such a short time were extremely low. Common sense suggested she was infected at the lab. The odds on this became even shorter when overseas testing found she had been struck down by the same strain of bacteria she had been studying, not one responsible for several other cases reported in the region at that time.
Nevertheless, the ESR chief executive, John Hay, contended Dr Adu-Bobie's infection was "a tragic coincidence". He said staff were not in any danger if they followed standard operating procedures.
One significant voice contradicted him, that of Sharron Bowers, a former ESR employee who contracted meningococcal meningitis in 1994 while also working with bacteria samples at the Crown research institute's Porirua centre. The lab was "the most likely source of infection", she observed.
It needs to be noted that the ESR was aided in its campaign of denial. Astoundingly, an initial Labour Department inquiry concluded it was "extremely unlikely" the disease was contracted at the lab. Much emphasis was also placed on a report by Australian microbiologist Andrew Lawrence that found the lab's systems, protocols and equipment appropriate, and said there was no evidence of any breakdown in safety procedures.
That did not tally with Dr Adu-Bobie's view that some procedures were different from those at an Italian lab where she had worked. She pinpointed two ESR practices as a possible cause of infection: plating solid bacteria on an open benchtop, and keeping plates at a temperature that could cause condensation to form on the lids.
The latest investigation, by the Labour Department's chief adviser on occupational health, began after Dr Adu-Bobie drew attention to research that suggested lab workers had a higher risk of infection. Finally, it and an ACC review have reached the only reasonable conclusion about the likely source of her ailment, and an apology has been made. But this report also found no fault with the ESR's safety systems. That is not reassuring, given Dr Adu-Bobie's comments and a record of at least two disease contractions in little more than a decade. Could this be more wishful thinking? One thing is certain: only the highest standard is appropriate, given the risk involved.
Besides Dr Adu-Bobie, there is now another victim - the ESR's credibility. Deservedly, it has attracted public opprobrium, and in far greater volume than would have been the case if it had admitted the obvious three years ago. Therein lies a lesson for officialdom.
