A country's future defence requirements are never clear. Defence white papers, such as the one released yesterday, can only point to probable threats and tailor expenditure to confront them.
When the money on offer is as tight as it is now, the equation becomes especially hard. Yet this very difficulty may result in clarity of thinking and a willingness to confront tough questions. It can also deliver realism of the sort that underpins the 2010 white paper.
The white paper signals a move away from the previous Government's defence policy in emphasis if not in equipment. Gone is talk of benign strategic environments and the weight placed on peacekeeping and peacemaking.
In its place is an acknowledgment that the next 25 years are likely to be more challenging than the previous quarter-century, prompting similar but intensified demands. In particular, the outlook for the South Pacific is said to be one of "fragility".
The white paper's rational answer to this is greater engagement with "like-minded" states - the United States, Australia, Britain and Canada - and an enhancement of the Defence Force's mix of front-line capabilities.
That will mean major spending as the Air Force's Hercules and Orions and the Navy's Anzac frigates come to the end of their lives.
It is here that the white paper enters more contentious territory, with its expectation that the Defence Force will play its part in funding this equipment, as well as upgrading, by "reprioritising and reallocating existing resources".
It is forecast that about $100 million will be freed by 2014-15 through a transformation programme, and a further $250 to $300 million annually from other initiatives.
Undoubtedly, there is scope for savings. But sometimes it is easy to overestimate the potential for them. And the trick will be to achieve them without compromising the ability of those on the front line to perform to the highest-possible standard.
An independent review has found that only 45 per cent of the Defence Force's operating costs are incurred in front-line activities. The target will, therefore, be middle and backroom operations.
As understandable as that is, the process must be undertaken carefully. Too heavy a hand would, inevitably, lead to a reduced level of professionalism even as the armed forces' overseas deployment capability is being boosted. At worst, they could become a liability to those serving alongside them.
Similar attention needs to be given to the plan to create hubs, starting with the Air Force and Army at Ohakea. The savings are readily apparent. It would mean moving the Linton base and reducing personnel at Waiouru. Once again, there is, unquestionably, room to rationalise the Defence Force's nine bases and two large training areas.
But only to a certain degree. Hubbing may be an excellent concept for container shipping and suchlike, but it goes against the military precept of not concentrating forces in one place.
The white paper may consider that New Zealand is "highly unlikely" to face a direct military threat over the next 25 years. But nothing is ever certain. The assault on the Twin Towers was a classic example of how things can change overnight.
In summary, the white paper will not prompt abrupt change. The continued emphasis on the armed forces specialising in a narrow area will not particularly thrill those "like-minded" states, which would prefer much-increased spending across a broader canvas. The recession has put paid to that.
At least, however, the intention is to enhance the capabilities of the Defence Force. Redeployment of its resources, if handled adroitly, will be a step forward.
<i>Editorial</i>: Skilful hand needed to rejig defence
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