<i>Editorial:</i> Send in the troops in war on terror

31 Oct, 2001 06:28 AM4 mins to read

General Richard Myers believes the American air campaign against Afghanistan is achieving its purpose. "We are pretty much on our plan. We are in the driver's seat," says the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. If such is the case, the car he is driving increasingly resembles a clapped-out Mini with no steering wheel.

In yet another exhibition of the limitations of air power, three weeks of strikes have failed to flush out Osama bin Laden or even prompt mass defections from the Taleban. The killing of innocent Afghan civilians has, however, provoked an increasing public dissent that threatens to spill over from the air strikes to undermine the war against terrorism.

The course of events should not have been unexpected. The well-worn strategy of aerial bombing and brief ground incursions has the virtue of keeping American losses to a minimum. But it was never going to destroy the al Qaeda organisation or, in all probability, lead to bin Laden's capture or death. Further, no such sustained assault was required to destroy Afghanistan's infrastructure. After more than 20 years of war, little of it was left.

The strategy is also risky. As civilian casualties mount, the negative effect on popular support in Muslim countries is particularly dangerous since the commitment to the anti-terrorism cause had always been tenuous.

Unfortunately, not only air operations have limited effect. Mounting long-range special forces operations is also fraught with difficulty. Such was the case with the first Rangers incursion, which came perilously close to disaster after running into stouter-than-expected Taleban resistance. That failure may have led the US military to reassess how soon and in what manner ground forces should be committed, and to prolong the aerial assault long after it has ceased to serve a purpose. American public opinion demands action but, while strategy is rethought, those strikes are promoted as the best option.

As a token, and it is to be hoped nothing more, American soldiers are also in northern Afghanistan to help coordinate attacks by the Northern Alliance on the Taleban. Using local forces to overthrow targets of American ire is another well-worn strategy, and another way of restricting American casualties. But the US surely recognises that the Northern Alliance could never rule Afghanistan effectively, if only because its membership is drawn from minority ethnic groups. It may play a part in a post-Taleban government but it is most useful as a distraction to the Taleban forces.

The scene is set for what must soon happen. The only means of capturing or killing bin Laden and destroying his organisation is through an invasion by American-led ground forces. That alone would satisfy an American public which demands an effective response to the horrors of the World Trade Center.

Ideally, such an assault would be mounted through one of Afghanistan's neighbours. But even through Pakistan, the most likely candidate, that is a hazardous proposition. The Musharraf Government would be placed under even greater pressure from Muslim fundamentalists.

The most logical means of attack is, therefore, an airborne assault. Afghanistan's three major airports would be the initial targets, and surprise the key weapon. Once the airports were taken, the invading army, rapidly reinforced with troops and armour, could fan out across Afghanistan.

Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 offers the blueprint for such an assault. However, the German paratroopers' capture of Crete in 1941 offers an example of the difficulties if the opposition is determined.

But it would be wrong to overestimate the Taleban's ability to resist strongly. Despite the Rangers' hiccup outside Kandahar, this is essentially an ill-equipped militia. Afghanistan is also a divided country. There is little evidence that most Afghans, when faced with an overwhelming force of arms, would fight to the death for the Taleban.

This time, they can also expect no outside help. And they will be opposed by American soldiers who, unlike the Russian conscripts of the 1980s war, are highly motivated. On the home front as well, most Americans are prepared to accept casualties, whatever the military's misgivings.

But the US must act quickly. The harsh Afghan winter is not far away, and the failings of the air campaign are causing popular support to wander. The present stalemate plays into the hands of bin Laden and the Taleban. Only a ground war will neutralise him and lay the groundwork for a responsible government in Kabul.

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