And so, after months of posturing and preparation, the Second Gulf War has begun. The United States, abetted by the scant membership of its "coalition of the willing", has attacked Iraq to effect regime change. President George W. Bush can expect his armed forces' awesome arsenal to provide a quick, relatively bloodless victory. He has promised food and medicine for the Iraqi people following their liberation from Saddam Hussein's "apparatus of terror". He, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and the world have much riding on this outcome. There is, however, no guarantee of a short, decisive war with beneficial results for all but Saddam.
An unmuddled outcome will be most likely if the American and British forces achieve two objectives: the minimisation of civilian deaths and the limiting of their own casualties. The two are not necessarily complementary. Mr Bush's aim of a "new Iraq that is prosperous and free" will be jeopardised by the death of every innocent civilian. As the toll mounts, so does the chance of radical Muslims gaining a foothold in post-war Iraq. The people of a secular state with no proven ties to al Qaeda will have cause to become enamoured of the very Muslim fundamentalism that the Bush Administration seeks to eradicate. Similarly, other Arab Muslim states and, indeed, Muslim nations everywhere, could expect a more vigorous pro-Islamist, anti-American sentiment within their borders.
The prospect of minimising civilian casualties should be enhanced by advances in precision bombing and the role to be played by US ground forces. Twelve years ago a limited land invasion of Iraq was preceded by six weeks of aerial bombardment. Civilian deaths escalated unavoidably. However, the Americans' use of their Army, predicated on the belief that the Iraqi armed forces will collapse, also heightens the chance of significant battlefield casualties. And support for the war in the US could turn if the toll among the invading soldiers rises alarmingly. For Mr Blair, who is already wrestling with the doubts of the British people and his own Labour Party, such a development could be calamitous.
Saddam will aim at just that outcome. In the First Gulf War the Shia and Kurdish conscripts who made up the bulk of the Iraqi Army ran up the white flag quickly. But the minority Sunni Iraqis, of whom Saddam is one, rallied behind their leader in Baghdad. Having achieved the main aim of liberating Kuwait, the American-led forces were faced with the potentially bloody task of flushing Saddam out of the Iraqi capital. The spectre of heavy casualties prompted them to decline.
This time, Saddam's tactics will be the same - and the British and American forces could yet be drawn into street fighting in Baghdad. That may be averted only by a siege of the city or by uprisings by the Kurds of northern Iraq or the Shia of the south which would topple Saddam. Thus Mr Bush's warning to Iraqi soldiers not to use weapons of mass destruction against anyone, including their own people. But Kurdish and Shia revolts were crushed in 1991, and notions of a recurrence are probably based more on hope than likelihood.
Most alarmingly of all, the invasion has no clear goals, the toppling of Saddam aside. The US appears to have no precise vision of the shape of a post-war Iraq. Nor does it seem to recognise the can of worms it could open there, and the potential for turmoil throughout the Muslim world. What, for example, if the Kurds declare independence? Turkey fears a similar reaction from its Kurdish minority. Will, in fact, Iraq disintegrate along ethnic lines, and the prospect of a prosperous and free nation prove a mirage?
It is to be hoped that American force of arms will achieve a speedy victory. But the acid test for the wisdom of the war lies in its aftermath.
Herald Feature: Iraq
Iraq links and resources
<i>Editorial:</i> Real test will come when battle is over
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