Editorial: PM's caveats on soldiers unrealistic

Opinion

John Key has acted correctly in sending Special Air Services troops back to Afghanistan so New Zealand can play its part in tackling "the breeding ground of international terrorism". If Afghanistan is lost to the Taleban, there is no doubt it will again become a bolthole for terrorists. Reconstruction efforts, including those of New Zealand's 140 military personnel in Bamiyan province, will have been for nought. The stakes are high. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the Prime Minister is so keen to place conditions on the deployment and length of service of this country's soldiers.

Mr Key said New Zealand's armed forces would be pulled out within five years under a new "orderly exit" strategy. The Bamiyan Provincial Reconstruction team would be replaced by more civilian experts and aid workers. The SAS, for its part, would go back to Afghanistan, for the first time since 2005, for just 18 months. While he would not comment on the troops' specific role, he had already said the elite force would not be used to train the fledgling Afghan Army because this was too dangerous.

There is an air of unreality about those caveats. In the opinion of Vice-Admiral William Sullivan, the United States Military Representative to Nato, the SAS would be ideally suited for such a mentoring role. Equally, the training of Afghan Army units is an essential prelude to the sort of orderly exit envisaged by the Prime Minister. As much will be acknowledged this week when, in a report on strategy in Afghanistan, the new commander-in-chief of the coalition forces, General Stanley McChrystal, will emphasise the necessity of "Afghanising" the conflict through the rapid training and arming of Kabul's forces.

Mr Key is right to view this work, which involves undertaking missions with less able Afghan troops, as particularly dangerous. British forces are now learning this, as have the Australians before them. But it is also vital. Safeguarding its soldiers in this manner places New Zealand in similar territory to countries such as Germany and France, which have refused to let their forces be deployed in Helmand province, the Taleban stronghold.

If the increasingly difficult circumstances of the war owe much to the Americans becoming distracted by the conflict in Iraq, the fair-weather approach of some of their European allies did nothing to prevent the fundamentalists' resurgence.

The Prime Minister's timetable for withdrawal may also be optimistic. It is understandable that Mr Key is worried this country may become involved in a Vietnam-type quagmire, with the potential for significant casualties. But a realistic appraisal, based on the new strategy adopted by the Obama Administration, suggests success will not be achieved within his time scale. This strategy is based more on protecting Afghans from the insurgents than tracking and eliminating Taleban fighters.

It is designed to provide more scope for reconstruction and economic development, and a stability that will allow the eventual withdrawal of coalition forces. All in all, this offers a greater prospect of a satisfactory outcome, as much as it will take perseverance.

The strategy involves troops going out on patrol to reassure and win over local people, and far fewer indiscriminate air strikes. There will be heavy combat on the ground, at least over the next year or two. The SAS, by dint of its training in reconnaissance and covert operations, may have been more suited to the previous, severely limited coalition strategy. But having been committed, it should be used where it can be most effective. If not, this country will be making a half-hearted contribution.