Editorial: NZ cannot ignore Afghanistan

No Government should commit this country's armed forces to any conflict without considerable forethought. New Zealand's international obligations, the prospects of a successful campaign, the potential for heavy casualties and possible alternative calls on the Army must all be considered.

Yet by any yardstick, the Prime Minister is proving hesitant over the dispatch of Special Air Service troops to Afghanistan. The United States asked in April for the SAS to be deployed, but a current review of this country's military commitments means no answer will be given until next month.

John Key seems instinctively to want to meet the American request. But he is clearly concerned about the potential for casualties in an increasingly bloody war and the risk of becoming embroiled in a quagmire.

The first matter should not be a major deterrent. Helen Clark's Government was probably fortunate that the previous three SAS tours of duty in Afghanistan did not yield casualties.

Nor have the activities of the provincial operation team, which has been in Bamiyan province since 2003. But the public would not, in any event, hold the Government responsible if New Zealand troops were to be killed. Nor, given the nature of SAS operations, are there likely to be the sort of casualties that have forced British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to defend his country's involvement in Afghanistan.

More fundamentally, most New Zealanders recognise their country must play a role in the escalating war against the Taleban. If the conflict is lost, Afghanistan will again become a bolt-hole for terrorism.

There are good reasons for heightened New Zealand involvement at an early stage. This is looming as a defining time in the struggle. The Americans, with Iraq now much less of a distraction, have poured 20,000 more troops into the country, sparking major new offensives against the Taleban in the south and east. Most encouragingly, the Obama Administration has insisted on a new strategy, which places less emphasis on tracking and killing Taleban fighters and more on protecting Afghans from the insurgents.

The assumption is that if local people can be made more secure and the Taleban kept away from them, much greater progress can be made in reconstruction and economic development. That, in turn, will garner the support of Afghans, allow the country to be stabilised, and pave the way for the eventual withdrawal of the international coalition.

The strategy involves troops going out on patrol to reassure local people, and means far less use of alienating devices, such as unmanned drones. It is far riskier, as the British have found, and requires far more troops than mounting raids from strongly defended bases.

It is also likely to take 10 to 15 years to implement successfully, starting with at least two years of heavy combat. That is another reality Mr Key must accept as he assesses New Zealand's commitment.

At the moment, it is not a timescale he appears to totally relish. He has talked of a US-led "surge" hastening the overall withdrawal.

The Americans had some success with this strategy in Iraq, but Afghanistan is far more complex, if only because the Taleban, largely composed of members of the Pashtun tribes, is so well integrated. Even striking deals with more-moderate Taleban leaders will prove far from easy, given the international coalition's emphasis on human rights and gender equality.

Nonetheless, this is not a struggle that New Zealand can shirk. Sending the SAS has nothing to with currying favour with the White House. It is about the way Afghanistan provided a training ground for worldwide terrorism. Last week's bombing in Jakarta reinforced the fact that every effort must be made to prevent that happening again.