KEY POINTS:
Only a drastic change in approach will fashion an improvement in Iraq's dire circumstance. This President George W. Bush failed to deliver when he announced a new strategy yesterday. Sending an extra 21,500 troops to Iraq, to supplement the 132,000 already there, will not change the course of the conflict. It is too little far too late. More than anything, this prescription speaks of the limits on United States' power, and the obduracy of a President who still believes that history will vindicate him.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the White House address was Mr Bush's admission that mistakes had been made in Iraq. Most fundamentally, he pointed to the US's failure to dispatch enough troops to thwart insurgents, who have managed to incite sectarian violence. Defeating Saddam Hussein's army was the easy part. Naively, the US expected the imposition of democracy and a process of national reconciliation would also be straightforward. It badly underestimated the number of troops needed to establish and maintain stability, even in Baghdad.
Given the President's admission and the dismal situation, any serious attempt to extract victory by force would require at least double the announced reinforcements. An increase in troop numbers of this proportion, backed operationally by armour and aerial power, is the only realistic military option. During the siege of Fallujah in 2004, US forces encountered well-organised resistance. Shiite and Sunni militias will be no less prepared now to confront large-scale assaults. Far more than an additional 21,500 troops would be required to overpower them. The shortfall owes much to America's limited military resources and perhaps a little to the antipathy of the US people - as voiced in the congressional elections - to a big escalation in troop numbers.
The new factor this time, and the key to victory, according to the White House, is the commitment of more Iraqi troops by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. This is wishful thinking, and not only because of the Iraqi leader's record of ambivalence. The report of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group left no doubt about the ineptness and unreliability of the Iraqi security forces. It will be up to the US to spearhead the crackdown on sectarian violence in Baghdad and Sunni-led insurgency in Anbar province. Likewise, the new goal for the Iraqis to take over their own security by November is unrealistic. It will take far longer to orchestrate a viable fighting force, notwithstanding a programme in which US trainers will be embedded in Iraqi security units.
Mr Bush can refer to the Iraq Study Group for some sort of backing. In what amounted to a passing reference, it supported "a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilise Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the US commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective". But this was part of an interlocking set of recommendations, and the study group stressed these should not be picked and chosen from. This is exactly what the President has done in declining to negotiate with Iran and Syria over Iraq and the wider Middle East.
Given the influence of those two countries, diplomacy is integral to the creation of stability in Iraq and reconciliation between the Shiites and Sunnis. In forsaking that, and, indeed, now adopting a more combative attitude to Iran and Syria, Mr Bush has left himself with only the military option. That will not work, either, because of the tepid nature of the troop reinforcement. The prognosis can only be for increased violence in Iraq and even more disillusionment in the US as American casualties mount.
