More illuminating than the report by Colin Carruthers, QC, on the Army's pursuit of a bigger share of the defence budget was the aftermath of its release. Mr Carruthers was mild in his conclusions, finding errors of judgment among Army top brass but no conspiracy to advance the Service at the expense of the Air Force and Navy. Clearly, he was far too meek for those deeply concerned at the crippling of parts of the armed forces. The likes, for example, of the Chief of Defence Force, Air Marshal Bruce Ferguson, who took it upon himself to castigate inappropriate attitudes within the Army in the late 1990s.
It may be relevant that Air Marshal Ferguson hails, as his rank signifies, from the junior Service. The Air Force has suffered most from Government funding decisions of the past few years. Shorn of its air combat wing, it has every right to feel emasculated, especially when viewing the lavish spending on armoured personnel carriers for the Army.
Such a funding disparity was, in fact, the outcome envisaged by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Gordon who, in a 1997 letter circulated to other officers, advocated a strategy that would see the Army disown its traditional political neutrality to campaign against the other Services for greater influence and Government money.
Mr Carruthers, while savaging Colonel Gordon's letter, finds no evidence that this strategy was acted on or was part of the Army's overall policy. Perhaps that conclusion might have been expected from a narrow, legalistic examination.
It seems clear, however, that there was a strong strand of such thinking in the Army, succoured by long-term inter-Service feuding. Why else, as Air Marshal Ferguson remarked, was a public relations firm hired to advance the Army's cause? Pertinently, that firm even prepared a document echoing Colonel Gordon's approach.
The Gordon letter was illustrative of the tensions between the Services. Effectively, the Defence Force of the late 1990s was dysfunctional. The Army's approach, which went far beyond normal case-building, was a major cause of that disarray. Thus, Air Marshal Ferguson is justified in criticising former Army chief Maurice Dodson's failure to stamp out an inappropriate attitude. "It was," he said, "a failure of leadership at the highest level."
Major-General Dodson has retired and, therefore, will not face any action. Indeed, the only officer censured has been the relatively junior Colonel Gordon. Other unnamed officers will be "counselled" for supporting the improper advancement of the Army or for not exposing the problem.
That hardly seems adequate redress for an approach that led to the dismemberment of a significant cog of our defence make-up. But, as Mr Carruthers implies, there may be no hard evidence to implicate other officers. They were not as careless as Colonel Gordon in advancing the Army's inappropriate attitude.
Inevitably, Air Marshal Ferguson will be seen to be settling old scores. That is an accident of timing and a defence chief from another Service may well also have felt the need to step over the Carruthers report. Now, however, his job must be to get the branches of the Defence Force operating effectively as a team. Changes in personnel at the top should help to dispel the rancour, as will the central co-ordination and control of each Service's public relations.
A degree of tension is, however, inevitable. Deplorable Government funding means the Services must compete for equipment. Success for one will generally be at the expense of the others. But never again must lobbying cross the line into cynical politicisation. The cost to the country and the price that men and women of the other Services may have to pay are too great.
nzherald.co.nz/defence
<i>Editorial:</i> Military infighting must stop
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