Editorial: Interim Iraq regime in a cleft stick

The very manner of the handover of sovereignty in Baghdad spoke volumes of the difficulties confronting the interim Iraqi Government. So racked is the country by insurrection and violence that it was impractical for the transfer to be done on schedule or with a flourish. Stealth had to achieve what American force of arms could not. Now that same Army is the sole buttress and protector of the interim Government, even as Prime Minister Iyad Allawi must seek to distance himself from the United States.

The new Administration's sole chance of achieving credibility with the Iraqi people lies in proving it is not a US puppet. It starts from an extremely weak base. This was not a transfer of sovereignty in the accepted sense of the word. The Government cannot make long-term policy decisions and does not have control of the 160,000 US-led foreign troops who remain in Iraq. Indeed, so supine is it that the Americans have been able to dictate that foreign contractors will be immune from prosecution under Iraqi law.

The interim Government is also tainted by past association with the US occupying regime; in too many ways it represents old wine in new bottles. The previous vintage, the Iraqi Governing Council, was quickly discredited. Now, many of the same names crop up in this Administration. Its only chance may lie in providing the stability and security that Iraqis crave. To this end, Mr Allawi has urged the country to unite against foreign Islamic insurgents.

At the same time, he has offered an amnesty to Iraqis who resisted the US occupation without joining the foreign terrorists. This is a shrewd appeal to patriotism and the desire of Iraqis for peace. But it will work only if the interim Government can convince Iraqis that it holds real power.

That cause would have been helped immensely if the US had not disbanded the Iraqi Army after toppling Saddam Hussein. As it is, the new Administration must urgently set about rebuilding the Army, police and intelligence services. In reality this cannot be achieved quickly and the Government has no chance of crushing the insurgents. For that it must rely on American troops who, through such actions as the siege of Fallujah, have alienated most sections of the population.

Ideally Iraqis would like the US forces and their coalition partners to retreat to the background, providing a recourse for the Allawi Government if the insurgency worsens. But they will be called upon immediately to police the new emergency laws that are expected to be among the Government's first actions. Indeed, the American presence is likely to be as visible as ever. And, whatever the protests of the Government, there is nothing to prevent a repeat of Fallujah.

George W. Bush, one eye fixed on the November presidential election, is in a self-congratulatory mood. The early handover of sovereignty was a success. It caught the insurgents off guard, thereby thwarting the wave of attacks that would have accompanied a June 30 transfer. But the necessity for such a tactic is a tacit admission that the insurgents have claimed the upper hand.

That realisation will embolden them and set the scene for escalating violence. With American troops providing the only answer to that threat, Iraqis could soon perceive that nothing has changed, that Iraq remains effectively under American occupation. If so, the Allawi Government will be a virtual irrelevance.

Herald Feature: Iraq