Editorial: Anzac task force may be a step too far

Talk of a closer defence relationship between New Zealand and Australia based on the Anzac tradition is a welcome development. This is especially the case because it emanates from an Australian defence white paper.

The Australians have spent much of the past decade sneering at the thrust of this country's defence policy and the stinginess of its spending on military equipment. Operating as the United States' deputy sheriff meant they had a far different global perspective.

Now, however, Australia has vacated that task and is treating defence of its own territory and growing instability in the Pacific as its main priorities. In that context, New Zealand has a more important role.

This country's Defence Force would doubtless relish closer contact with its Australian counterpart. Already, there is a close working relationship and sharing of resources.

That is logical, given a multitude of compatibilities, not least in outlook and expertise. New Zealand and Australian forces have worked well together in the likes of East Timor and the Solomons.

The Australian white paper wants that co-operation to be tightened, especially in transport and logistics. In terms of that relationship, it also foresees the formation of an Anzac task force capable of deploying rapidly and "seamlessly" into the immediate region.

That may be a step too far. There are obvious issues around the use of such a force. Most of these revolve around the fact that the interests of New Zealand and Australia, while closely aligned, do not always correspond. Australia, for example, has always had a far more equivocal attitude towards Asia.

Five years ago, this led it to hesitate to sign a non-aggression pact with the Asean bloc. Now, its white paper has angered China by singling out the risk posed by Beijing's growing military and economic power. Indeed, Australia's response, a fleet of long-range submarines equipped with cruise missiles, has sparked fears of a regional arms race.

New Zealand has succeeded in building a privileged relationship with China, and stands to benefit enormously from growing trade. It would not want that tarnished by being implicated in rash acts of gunboat diplomacy that might, say, compromise Chinese trade in the Pacific.

That is not to say New Zealand would not stand by Australia if it was directly threatened. Such is the strength of the Anzac tradition. But it would not want to be involved in needless or futile interventions by an Anzac task force or to be rushed into decision-making. As evidenced by East Timor, Canberra has always been somewhat quicker to commit troops to trouble spots.

The rules under which such a force operated would, therefore, have to carefully circumscribed. New Zealand would have to have the right to hold back its troops from any task force intervention. There could be no prospect of Australia, as the senior partner, being able to strong-arm it into participating in operations that, for whatever reason, were not in its strategic interests.

Both governments have been quick to say that any integration would not prejudice policy choices or lead to any loss of independence. But even with safeguards, it is possible to see scenarios in which Australia would be tempted to pressure New Zealand to get the maximum policy benefit for itself from an Anzac task force.

Overall, the Australian white paper benefits this country significantly. Australia has shifted its focus closer to home but will retain a strong military presence.

Its wish for greater co-operation with the New Zealand Defence Force will doubtless be echoed by a similar document being prepared in Wellington. It would be wise, however, to think carefully about how far that relationship should go.