Dialogue: Why we can't handle instability in Pacific

By WAYNE MAPP*

Recent troubles in the Solomon Islands, East Timor and Fiji should convince New Zealanders of the need to reassess our naval strength. Our need for an adequate Navy has become as big an issue for the Defence Force as the re-equipment of the Army and the replacement of the Skyhawks.

The precise configuration of the Navy must take into account increasing Pacific instability, the fact that we must work together with Australia in regional leadership roles, and that we are a maritime region.

The troubles in the islands to our north have re-emphasised the fact that only Australia and New Zealand can provide the immediate leadership clearly needed in our region.

The coincidence of unrest in Fiji and the Solomons, while we have commitments in East Timor, has demonstrated that our commitments are greater than a two-frigate Navy can handle.

The changeover in the Solomons, where both Anzac frigates were simultaneously on station, shows just how stretched our two-frigate Navy would be. What will happen once we lose the services of our third frigate, the 30-year-old Canterbury, which is due to go out of service in 2005?

Because we live in a maritime region, the composition of our maritime forces is fundamental.

New Zealand has a responsibility for a huge area of ocean, extending well beyond our exclusive economic zone. Strategic concerns are much greater than fisheries patrols and search and rescue.

It is fundamental to our role that we are able to protect our forces on deployment, and to play our part to secure the stability of our region. That means ships and aircraft equipped to undertake clear military tasks.

The issue is broader than simply the number and type of ships. It also extends to airborne maritime surveillance with the Orion aircraft fleet.

The Greens' view on the re-equipment of the Orions would, if adopted, result in our isolation from our traditional allies and would reduce our maritime surveillance capability to that of a coastguard. In effect, we would be surrendering leadership in our region and the ability to work alongside Australia, simply to satisfy a naive view of the world.

The essential requirements of a blue-water Navy are relatively simple: sustainability, interoperability, independence and the ability to support land operations, either to protect a deployment or to make the deployment.

Sustainability requires us to have enough ships of compatible capabilities. In the light of the instability to our north, and the risk of unwelcome military incursions in our region, there is compelling evidence that a minimum of three ships is necessary. And not just any three ships.

Patrol craft would be insufficient because New Zealand's real military requirements are much more than simply the patrol of our economic zone. And a Navy tanker such as the Endeavour is not a substitute for a Navy frigate.

What is needed are warships able to project power and protect themselves, and with sufficient commonality to be able to achieve military goals.

Interoperability is essential for a small Navy working closely with allies, especially Australia. The need for a close working relationship with the Australian Navy has been well illustrated by recent events.

Our ships need to be able to substitute for Australian ships on regional tasks.

It is crucial that the forces of the two countries have the closest possible operational integration in order for the two nations to effectively fulfil their leadership roles.

Commonality also makes financial sense. Within our own fleet, having a minimum number of ship types has large savings in training, spare parts and crew sizes. Complementary systems will also ensure reduced maintenance costs.

While it is rare for ships to be identical, particularly if their purchase is spread over several years, a high level of common systems is obviously desirable. Already the Canterbury, a Leander class frigate, is effectively an orphan alongside the two Anzac frigates, Te Kaha, and Te Mana.

In terms of interoperability and the need for commonality, the Anzac platform is suitable to support a variety of roles, even if all the ships are not identical. It is essential that these ships can perform serious military tasks.

The instability of the region has also underscored the importance of being able to deploy our armed forces rapidly. More than the Charles Upham is required to be able to fulfil military sealift.

In the South Pacific, ships need to also be able to perform command and control, to serve as a secure base, provide substantial helicopter lift and lighterage. In short, New Zealand needs the capability to deploy our armed forces into a hostile environment.

This requirement has been well understood by a number of nations. Australia, Singapore, the Nato countries, including Britain, France, Italy and Spain have all developed ships to deploy amphibious forces.

While the upper end of such a capability is beyond our means, the ships used by Singapore and Italy would be suitable for the range of foreseeable military roles, ranging from disaster relief to deploying soldiers into a dangerous environment, such as East Timor and the Solomons.

Such ships need to be protected by frigates from higher-level threats, but in many environments they would be self-sufficient.

Events in our region in the past few months are a timely reminder of our need for an integrated defence force - at sea, on land and in the air - able to answer challenges in more than one hotspot.

This may be at odds with the attitudes of the Government to our defence needs, but it is not at odds with what is really happening in a region in which we have obligations to preserve peace, security and democracy.

* Dr Wayne Mapp is the National spokesman on defence.