Dialogue: Politicians' vested interests dominate electoral system

Parliament's decision to deny a referendum on MMP highlights some disturbing features of our present system, write JAMES ALLAN and GRANT HUSCROFT*.

MMP is a bad electoral system. Indeed, even in terms of proportional systems MMP is a bad choice.

It uses closed lists that shut the voters out from choosing almost half of MPs. The list MPs owe their allegiance and their very survival in Parliament to the party hierarchy, full stop.

You can see why, then, the politicians have rallied around MMP - nearly half of our legislators have no electoral accountability.

MMP has resulted in greater proportionality in Parliament for the political parties, but proportionality has come at the expense of accountability. Numerous people who could not possibly be elected directly by voters under any other voting system have been appointed to Parliament from party lists.

Indeed, many members of Labour and National would be rejected if they dared face an electorate. Some of those who did so in the last election were defeated, yet not only were they appointed to Parliament through their parties' lists, they ended up as ministers.

Under MMP, politicians have a double chance: they can lose their electorate, yet still be appointed to Parliament from the list.

Margaret Wilson ran third against Winston Peters, the most unpopular politician in the country in 1999, but was appointed to Parliament from the Labour list. She holds several important Cabinet portfolios and, as Attorney-General, enjoys the exclusive authority to appoint judges.

Not only does MMP let the political parties determine the composition of the legislature, it precludes accountability at election time.

Unhappy with the performance of an MP or a minister? Too bad. As long as they are in favour with their parties, they are ensconced in Parliament whether the voters like it or not.

Max Bradford, the author of the electricity reforms in the last Government, was soundly rejected in his electorate, but remains on the National front bench. His ranking on the National Party list determines the length of his stay in Parliament, regardless of what the people want.

As though all of this were not enough, MMP gives vastly disproportionate power to small parties such as the Greens, Act, New Zealand First and the Alliance, all of which usually hover around the 5 per cent threshold in voter support.

It forces coalition talks after the election, during which political programmes are negotiated with these small parties. Outside formal coalitions, small parties may wield considerable power on an ad hoc basis.

The future of the national superannuation scheme may be determined by the votes of New Zealand First, which should not even be represented in Parliament at all.

Democratic? Hardly. Indeed, the 5 per cent threshold, which was designed to keep small parties like New Zealand First out of Parliament, is circumvented by an exception that allows several members to be appointed from a party list so long as the party wins a single electorate seat.

What this means, as we saw in the last election, is that some votes count more than others. Those voters in Tauranga who allowed Winston Peters to win his electorate by a mere 63 votes elected not only Mr Peters but three additional MPs, who entered Parliament on the strength of the party's meagre share of the national vote.

Proportional, yes. Legitimate? Hardly. This feature of our electoral system is notorious, and the parties plan their political campaigns around it.

Labour is unlikely to contest Jim Anderton's seat, lest he lose and the Alliance get no seats if, as seems likely, it fails to reach the 5 per cent threshold.

National is likely to let its possible coalition partner, Act, have a free run in a National seat to ensure that Act is represented by several members in the next Parliament, even if it does not make the 5 per cent threshold.

Whatever else might be said against first-past-the-post, we used to have a system that remains good enough for Canada, England and the United States, among other English-speaking countries.

And at least it did not allow political parties to appoint MPs.

Assuming that greater proportionality is desired, a number of alternatives to MMP are preferable because they allow the voter to choose the elected representative.

But this is not the place to talk of alternatives to MMP. What is clear is the undemocratic nature of the select committee review of MMP. Start with the terms of reference - they required unanimity or near unanimity if the committee was to recommend change. In other words, the whole thing was a put-up job from start to finish.

Make some list MPs part of a select committee, MPs whose very jobs depend on there being no change to the system, and then require near unanimity. Is anyone surprised by the select committee's decision recommending no changes?

The Prime Minister has attempted to defend this put-up job. There's no great demand for change, she claims; the heat has gone out of the issue. Her Government is showing how well MMP can work, she says.

The fact that a clear majority of the public wants a referendum on whether we should keep MMP - 76 per cent expressed this view in a poll prepared at the select committee's request - suggests otherwise, but that is irrelevant to those in power.

Barring the sort of political gaffe that led David Lange to promise a referendum on MMP in the first place (he had misread his briefing notes), the public is unlikely to be given any further say in the matter.

The unwillingness of politicians to let the people have a referendum to determine their own electoral system shows just how undemocratic MMP can be.

It has simply allowed the vested interests of the two-party system to be replaced by the vested interests of a multi-party system.

* James Allan lectures in the University of Otago faculty of law. Grant Huscroft lectures in the University of Auckland faculty of law.