There is no point to new party-hopping legislation other than to enhance the power of political parties and their leadership, writes GRANT HUSCROFT*.
It is ironic that the move to proportional representation, a move born of disillusionment with the manner in which politics is conducted in New Zealand, has, in fact, consolidated the power of the political parties in Parliament and, in particular, party leadership.
Parliament has passed the Electoral Integrity Amendment Act, which purports to enhance public confidence in the electoral system and the proportionality of party representation in Parliament.
What the law does, in fact, is allow party leaders to fire members of Parliament, something that is unprecedented in New Zealand's parliamentary tradition.
The act allows a party leader to give written notice to an MP in his or her party stating that he or she reasonably believes that the MP concerned has acted in a way that has distorted, and is likely to continue to distort, the proportionality of political party representation in Parliament as determined at the last general election.
The MP has 21 days in which to respond, following which the party leader may fire the MP from Parliament simply by providing written notice to the Speaker, asserting that two-thirds of the parliamentary members of the party agree (on some undetermined basis).
This power extends to any MP, not just those appointed to Parliament from the party list. Why was such a step taken? Everyone recalls the defections from various parties in the last Parliament. This led the Labour Party to include party-hopping legislation as an election promise, and no doubt it was a popular promise.
But everyone should also recall that those who defected were harshly dealt to once they had to front up to defend their actions at election time. Alamein Kopu, Tau Henare and others were all soundly defeated in their re-election attempts. The public made its judgment.
Why should the actions of some unpopular politicians in the last Parliament lead to the establishment of greater powers for the political parties in future Parliaments? After all, responsibility for the selection of MPs lies with the political parties and their supporters.
They are the ones who nominate candidates to run in electorates, and establish party lists from which MPs are appointed to Parliament. If they exercise poor judgment in doing so, or come to regret the choices they have made, they have only themselves to blame. They have no claim on the protection of the law to ensure the continued strength of their parties in Parliament.
On the contrary, there may be good reason for an MP to oppose party policy, or even to switch parties.
An MP may in good faith consider that it is in the public interest to do so. Why should his party leader be able to invoke the threat of dismissal from Parliament to coerce him into supporting the party's political position?
It is wrong to pretend this act is required to protect the integrity of the electoral system. MMP is about the manner in which elections are held and Parliament is constituted. It has little to do with what happens once governments are formed.
This act is designed to enhance the power of political parties and their leadership. Specifically, it is designed to ensure that MPs toe the party line.
Imagine the power an autocrat like Sir Robert Muldoon could have wielded under this act. Imagine the power that Helen Clark and others will wield.
Unusually, the act has an expiry clause. It expires following the second election held after its passage. It is designed, we are told, to bed in the adjustment to MMP.
Yet if the objectives of the act are legitimate and necessary, there is no reason for its limited duration. The act's supporters cannot have it both ways.
Regardless of the expiry clause, the act sets a dangerous precedent. MMP already allows parties, rather than the people, to determine who will serve in Parliament. The voting public has no input into the composition of the party lists, nor can voters change the order of the list. Indeed, even those who are defeated in an electorate may be appointed directly to Parliament from a party list - a double chance at election.
Once they are in Parliament, this act confirms that MPs serve at the pleasure of political parties, rather than the public. Legitimate disagreement within parties, surely a healthy sign in a democracy, will be chilled, as those who dissent risk not only their future within their parties but also dismissal from Parliament by their party leaders.
* Grant Huscroft, formerly of Auckland University, lectures at the Western Ontario University faculty of law.
<i>Dialogue:</i> Parties using new laws to strengthen their positions
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