Dialogue: Little Commonwealth can do about conflicts

by CHRIS LAIDLAW*

If ever Don McKinnon thought he was going to have an easy time of it as Commonwealth Secretary-General, his hopes will have been well and truly dashed.

First, the Solomons erupted in an ugly demonstration of ethnic animosity. Next, Robert Mugabe decided to set aside the rule of law in Zimbabwe by encouraging war veterans to invade privately owned farms, and telling the world to take a running jump when the voices of objection began to be raised. Then, as if that were not more than enough for the Commonwealth to grapple with, came the cataclysm in Fiji.

Each of these events in its own way has demanded a response from the Commonwealth community for the simple reason that the Commonwealth has set itself a collective obligation to live up to certain standards when it comes to respect for democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.

In reality, however, there is little the Commonwealth can do in any of these conflicts. As it found in the case of Nigeria a few years earlier, the only real weapon available these days is the power of disapproval and, in extreme cases, outright rejection by the collective membership.

The whole issue of coordinated sanctions programmes is one that has become increasingly difficult to envisage as a way of pressuring errant regimes into compliance with international norms.

Economic sanctions were difficult enough for the Commonwealth, the United Nations or anyone else to impose with any real effect on rogue regimes like that in Rhodesia in the 1970s.

They proved extremely contentious in the case of South Africa in the 1980s and they are a virtual impossibility now as the march of globalisation sweeps away economic frontiers and virtually prevents the isolation of a single country any more.

There is, too, the practical consideration of the impact of sanctions being felt most by those who are least deserving of it.

The issue has arisen again this year and both Zimbabwe and Fiji pose the very real question as to what, if anything, the Commonwealth can effectively do beyond dark mutterings of discontent.

Zimbabwe has sailed close to the edge of the world of approval by its open disregard for the rule of law and as a result of the unprecedented encouragement by President Mugabe of the violent tactics of war veterans who have occupied privately owned farms.

It hasn't gone far enough, however, to warrant the imposition of Commonwealth-wide sanctions. Had the recent election not been as trouble-free as it demonstrably was, and had there not been a more than credible showing by the new opposition party, it might have been a different story. Had there been genuine evidence of ballot-rigging, it would certainly have been a different story.

But the Commonwealth was far from satisfied with the conditions that prevailed before the election. The fact that there was so much pre-election violence, and that that violence was orchestrated from on high through the labyrinth of extra-governmental command structures that characterise the darker side of African politics, has left a very unpleasant taste.

Some member countries, notably Britain, have drawn their own conclusions from this and imposed unilateral restraints on their relations with Zimbabwe. That is, of course, the prerogative of any single government.

The Commonwealth observer group which monitored the lection process noted in its final report that there was a real need for the Mugabe Administration to restore the confidence of the rest of the Commonwealth community if it were to escape the axe of suspension or even expulsion.

The rule of law, for instance, needs to be restored unequivocally and an equitable solution needs to be found to the land resettlement question.

The Commonwealth will want to see a fresh start to constitutional reform designed to reduce the excessive powers of the executive presidency. Failing progress on these fronts, it seems inevitable that the Commonwealth will be forced to act, and suspension will be the first option.

Fiji is of a rather different order of significance. Here, the issue is one of the violent overthrow of a legitimately elected Administration and Fiji has dealt itself out of Commonwealth just as it did in 1987.

The big question is what else does the Commonwealth do about the chaotic situation in Suva? Is there any real value in trying to impose a full range of economic sanctions in the full knowledge that these will not necessarily do any good in helping to restore a semblance of democracy there?

The economy of Fiji has been crippled by the foolhardy actions of George Speight and his henchmen. Cane farmers, tourism operators, shopkeepers, service providers, ordinary workers - Fijian and Indian alike - are all victims.

The best thing that the Commonwealth can now do, having suspended Fiji's membership, is to offer technical assistance to the incoming Government to strengthen its ability to at least get some things right in coming months. Individual countries, as they have in the case of Zimbabwe, will take their own actions in response to the situation in Fiji as they see it.

New Zealand and Australia will have little option but to be seen to be more severe than other more distant countries. But there will be limits and it would be a mistake for either New Zealand or Australia to try to throw the book at Fiji, particularly now that the hostage crisis is over and an administration of some sort, no matter how makeshift or unsatisfactory it seems, now has to try to pick up the pieces.

Democracy is a fragile flower. The Commonwealth, whose chief preoccupation these days is in nurturing that flower, knows only too well that the weeds will soon take over if the nurturing is not constant and sensitive to the weather.

* Chris Laidlaw, a former special assistant to the Commonwealth Secretary-General, was a member of the observer group which oversaw the Zimbabwe election.