There is a deep irony in the Fijian distrust of and hostility towards the Indians. The Indians have historically been great benefactors to the Fijians. When Britain annexed Fiji in 1874, at the repeated request of the leading chief, Cakobau, the Fijian people were facing depopulation and social disruption as a result of intensifying contact with European settlers.
Then, in 1875, Governor Arthur Gordon arrived. He was determined to control the damage, to ensure that Fijians remained in their villages under their chiefs and in possession of most of their lands. A key component of his programme was to obtain Indians as contract labourers to work on the European-owned sugar plantations.
Between 1879 and 1911, more than 60,000 Indians were imported. They were the basis of the present Indian population. Meanwhile, the Fijians recovered and the commercial economy thrived, but the Indians had endured what they called "narak," or "hell."
In 1875 the Colonial Office promised that the Indians would enjoy all the rights of British subjects but, as one historian states, "they remained a human subsidy to Gordon's Fijian welfare policy." Indeed, from the 1920s the colonial officials in Fiji explicitly defined their policy as one of maintaining "the primacy of Fijian interests," a phrase that many Fijians erroneously believe was used in the 1874 Deed of Cession.
In contrast, from 1911 the Indians tended to apply themselves to improving their situation through hard work, thrift and self-reliance. Seeking education and engaging in commerce, they built a middle class but their success only added to the disparities, religious and ethnic, that existed between the two communities.
The lines were parallel, not convergent. The Indians desired parity but the Fijians expected privilege - and usually got it.
Many Fijians, impressed by Idi Amin in Uganda, hoped that independence in 1970 would involve the expulsion of the Indians. It did not, but it did bring in a gerrymandered constitution that favoured the Fijians.
Not satisfied with this, the extreme Taukei nationalists became more vocal. Consequently in the election of 1976 the Fijian vote split. Thus the Indian Federation found itself the largest party in the Parliament, but before it could form a government, the Governor-General invited Ratu Mara, whose Alliance Party had lost the election, to continue as Prime Minister. Mara accepted and later that year called another election. This time he won.
He was still Prime Minister in April 1987 when the Fijian vote again split. This time the largely Indian-supported Labour-Federation coalition, led by Timoti Bavadra, became the Government. There was no legal threat to Fijian lands since the constitution entrenched protection of indigenous assets but the Alliance antagonised the Taukei.
A month later (on the pretext of preserving law and order), Colonel Rabuka overthrew the Government in a military coup. Within hours Ratu Mara had joined the new Administration. Later he was again appointed Prime Minister and subsequently became Governor-General. Retaining power was imperative for him.
He held that position on May 19 when, a year after the election of an Indian as Prime Minister, Speight staged his coup. The template of historical continuity, though, had been made long before and Ratu Mara himself had helped to fashion it.
A sinister rationalisation has emerged from these events. It is that democracy is not suited to Fiji. Such a notion betrays a misunderstanding of the term, and contains dangerous assumptions. Democracy is a permissive arrangement more than a prescriptive one, and it is flexible enough to accommodate special interests without resorting to severe discrimination.
In contrast, the right to govern with the fullness of power by virtue of indigeneity, as claimed by Speight, recognises no internal constraints. It not only subjugates the Indians and undermines the national economy but it erodes various other protections even for the Fijians themselves, for theirs is by no means a homogeneous society.
There are powerful class, religious and, above all, regional differences, especially between the eastern and western districts. Even the Great Council of Chiefs, a consultative body set up by Gordon, is not unified. Nor does it control the Army, which is itself divided.
The prognosis is not good. The outcome of recent events is likely to see a rejection of the relative inclusiveness that marked the 1970 and 1999 constitutions and a reversion to that of 1990 which suppressed Indian political rights.
That is something New Zealand will not be able to prevent, but which it should not condone. In Fiji Speight has slain not a dragon but a golden goose. We should be concerned lest the fire he has lit threatens to cook our one.
* Hugh Laracy lectures in Pacific Islands history at Auckland University.
More Fiji coup coverage
Main players in the Fiji coup
The hostages
Under seige: map of the Parliament complex
Fiji facts and figures
Images of the coup - a daily record
George Speight: "I’m certainly not mad."