Dialogue: Diplomacy a better bet than US missile proposal

President George W. Bush has struggled to sell his missile defence plan in Europe. And with good reason, writes GUY WILSON-ROBERTS*.

President George W. Bush has had a difficult time in the past week persuading European governments to support his missile defence plan.

They have good reason to be sceptical. The New Zealand Government has also expressed its concerns, and should continue to do so.

During a visit to Europe in May, Secretary of State Colin Powell also failed to overcome resistance within Nato to missile defence. The Nato statement was a watered-down version of what the United States wanted, playing down the threat from "least-responsible states."

Powell was able to prevent any mention of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The centrepiece of Bush's current argument is that the treaty is out of date and a relic of the Cold War. The treaty was signed in 1972 between the US and the Soviet Union and places strict limits on missile defences. It is admirable that Bush wants to move strategic policy beyond the Cold War paradigm, a move that is long overdue. However, the ABM Treaty should not be abandoned so hastily, because it still embodies an important principle.

The treaty is a relic of the Cold War, just as the Geneva Convention is a relic of the inter-war period and the United Nations Charter a relic of post-Second World War idealism. Treaties and conventions endure when they are still relevant today.

The ABM Treaty is still relevant because it established the important principle that offensive capabilities are more cost-effective than defensive capabilities. This principle was well understood by those who negotiated it in the early 1970s.

If the US were to deploy a Clinton-style national missile defence, with ground-based interceptors, adversaries could develop cheap and simple countermeasures. With some sort of sea-based boost-phase system, adversaries could investigate fast-boost missiles, attack the launch platforms, build more ballistic missiles, or develop cruise missiles instead.

Because defensive technologies are in their infancy, the advantage will remain with offensive technologies for decades to come.

The Europeans, and others including the New Zealand Government, are justifiably concerned that if the US builds defensive capabilities against nuclear ballistic missiles, other states will build more offensive capabilities, undermining progress in the control of nuclear weapons.

Bush's plan is driven by his campaign promise and the ideological commitment to missile defence held by prominent members of his team.

Missile defence sounds like a simple solution to the problem of missile attack, much as President Reagan resolved to trust American technology rather than trust the Soviets in his Star Wars proposal.

The potential cost of missile defences does not yet seem to be a concern, pandering to conservative myths about outspending adversaries.

While it might be unfair to criticise Bush's missile defence proposal before he has the chance to substantiate it, criticism from allies and friends should aim to moderate his thinking.

At present, missile defence is not sensible policy. The political, diplomatic and financial costs are all up front. Unfortunately, the technology will not be ready to deploy for at least five years and the threat, if it appears at all, is similarly years away.

Centrist analysts in Washington are exploring the potential for compromises on missile defence: how to include allies and friends, how to mollify Russia and China, and how to use missile defence as a means for greater reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons.

The New Zealand Government might wish to consider the idea of multilateral missile defence as an arms-control tool.

It remains to be seen if Bush will agree to compromise with allies, friends and others. While not completely opposed, the Europeans would at the minimum like to see a more realistic threat assessment and a framework that preserves good relations with Russia.

However, because of the ideologues in the Bush team, the US may edge towards missile defence unilateralism if compromise proves elusive.

Ultimately, despite Bush's rhetoric, the threat that missile defence is to counter has yet to materialise. North Korea is often cited as the main threat. Yet the Clinton Administration may well have been literally weeks away from securing a deal with North Korea on its primitive ballistic missile programme, following Secretary Albright's visit last October.

Diplomacy can be time consuming, frustrating, and always requires compromise. With the cost of missile defence continually being increased in tens-of-billions-of-dollars increments, diplomatic arms control is still cheaper.

This is the enduring legacy of the ABM Treaty. Diplomacy also offers a more lasting solution by negotiating missiles away, and increasing trust and transparency.

We can call this pre-boost-phase missile defence, and at least it works.

* Dr Guy Wilson-Roberts is deputy director of Victoria University's centre for strategic studies.