The Government's Defence Force policy for all three services does more harm than good - even for the combat viability of the Army, writes DAVID DICKENS*.
Prime Minister Helen Clark's defence announcements cast a dark shadow over the future of the Defence Force.
On the face of it, some parts of the new defence package are positive. The Navy gains a multi-role combat capability ship with its own helicopter. The Charles Upham is to be sold. Thus, New Zealand still cannot move its Army overseas.
The Air Force Orions receive new navigation equipment. Promises have been made to review the replacement of the Air Force helicopters and Hercules transport aircraft. The Air Force may also get to hire two jet transport aircraft to replace its Boeing 727s.
The Army gains 105 new sophisticated, combat-capable light armoured vehicles, communications equipment and light vehicles.
Overall, however, the effect of the defence package is negative. The gains for each service are offset by serious losses.
The Navy loses a frigate and a third of its combat capability. The Air Force loses 95 per cent of its combat capability. The Orions' sensors, search radars, anti-submarine warfare equipment and digital data link to communicate with friendly aircraft and warships will not be upgraded. The Orions systems will soon be incompatible with the warships and aircraft of friends and our ally, Australia.
All 17 A4K Skyhawks, upgraded in the 1980s and early 1990s, are to be scrapped. Also going are the Air Force's 17 Aeromacchi MB 339 jet trainers. All up, the Air Force loses 34 aircraft, or 57 per cent of its fleet. The Air Force is effectively disarmed and is no longer a fighting force. It loses three squadrons.
While the Army will get some very good new equipment, it misses out in other ways. It will not get new armoured vehicles for its only armoured reconnaissance regiment, Queen Alexandra's Mounted Rifles. The regiment will be disbanded, according to insiders.
Even more seriously, the Army does not get anything near the reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (RISTA) equipment it needs.
Overall, the Army's gains are neutralised by its losses. It will also lose an important element of its force structure.
However, these are only the obvious consequences of the Government's defence package. There are other hidden costs in the announcements.
The Skyhawks were not a nice-to-have capability. Without them, both the Navy and the Army lose combat capacity. Without a combat capacity, the Defence Force cannot undertake peacekeeping properly.
The Skyhawks are one of the best maritime strike forces in the region. They provided much of New Zealand's contribution to the integrated air defence system in Malaysia, the operational part of the Five Power Defence Arrangement between Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.
The Skyhawks also provide world-class training support for the Royal Australian Navy. The New Zealand Skyhawk squadron in Nowra, New South Wales, is regarded by the Australian Navy and Air Force as outstanding.
Further, the Skyhawks provided Nato-quality close air support for the Army. A not-long-retired commanding officer of the First New Zealand Special Air Service group has said that without air combat capacity, the SAS cannot be qualified as forward air controllers. This is a fundamental Special Forces skill. It may well be the only form of friendly fire the SAS may be able to call on to extricate itself and, more critically, may be the destructive fire used in a mission. The SAS forward air controller course is Nato-compliant and the SAS have to be trained to this standard for United Nations peacekeeping and regional security roles.
The Air Force's 75 Squadron contributed directly to the preparation of the SAS for peacekeeping missions.
Other Army officers at the coalface say much the same thing. While these officers appreciate the new armoured vehicles, which provide a leap in one form of capability, they emphasise that without the Skyhawks, RISTA and armoured reconnaissance vehicles the Army's overall combat viability is in question.
The Government's defence announcements, while touted as a major boost for peacekeeping and the Army, may have done more harm than good.
These decisions raise questions about strategic judgment. New money is to be spent on defending our exclusive economic zone. Yet the zone is already well protected. Where is the evidence of a threat to the zone in the short term?
Curiously, the Skyhawk contribution to Nowra is to be canned in December. Yet Australia is willing to continue funding the Nowra agreement (it pays New Zealand $9.6 million a year) until 2003. The Nowra agreement is to be cancelled even though it is cost-neutral for us. What message does this send to Australia?
Much emphasis is placed on peace-keeping while the Army's peacekeeping capability is undermined. New Zealand is largely withdrawing from regional security. Yet 75 per cent of our trade is with Asia-Pacific partners. This trade is dependent on regional stability.
Most of our external trade is carried by ship (99 per cent of exports by volume and 95 per cent by value). The rest is carried by air. Almost all New Zealanders travel abroad by air. There is an air of unreality in these decisions.
* Dr David Dickens is director of Victoria University's Centre for Strategic Studies.
<i>Dialogue:</i> Clark's defence policy has an air of unreality
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