In 1992 and 1993 the US encouraged the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Libya. These included an air and arms embargo, a ban on foreign corporations drilling for oil in Libyan territory and a freeze on Libya's assets abroad. The intention was to force Libya's volatile leader, Colonel Gaddafi, to hand the suspects over for trial.
There was a stalemate between the US and Libya over this issue for most of the 1990s. However, Libya eventually realised it would be in its best long-term interests to be more cooperative, not least because of the prospect of oil revenue from foreign corporations (which were equally interested in resuming business).
Given the political will to compromise, it was necessary to find a mechanism that would permit a trial to proceed that would save Gaddafi's face.
He could not afford to be seen in the Arab world as backing down to the US. Libya insisted that the trial be held outside Scotland; the US and Britain insisted on Scotland's jurisdictional rights.
In the end, a United Nations-brokered compromise enabled the trial to be held at Camp Zeist, a former Nato air base in the Netherlands, which was declared Scottish territory for the duration of the proceedings.
The trial began on May 3, 2000, and in February 2001 the Scottish judges found one of the accused guilty and one innocent.
The Lockerbie precedent is worth exploring for five reasons. First, the Taleban cannot simply hand over Osama bin Laden (or any other suspect on their territory) to the US; there would be too much loss of face in the Islamic world. But they could hand him over to a trial to be conducted on neutral territory under the usual rules of court procedure. Such a trial would oblige the US authorities to provide the evidence of his guilt. If they do not have the evidence, he would be found innocent.
Secondly, such a trial would also be of benefit to President George W. Bush. Military action against Afghanistan is being demanded in some quarters but there are doubts about the value of such an operation.
An aerial attack would not necessarily kill bin Laden. A land-based operation is also risky. The Afghans have beaten all invaders since Alexander the Great. The Soviet defeat in the 1980s contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Incidentally, Afghanistan, thanks to the Soviet invasion, is one of the world's most heavily mined countries.
On the current rate of clearance, it will not be clear until the year 2200; and so the landmines would also be a risk for military personnel.
Thirdly, there is the danger that if bin Laden were killed in a military operation, he would become a martyr to the cause. There could be, for example, spontaneous rebellions by sympathisers in other countries.
But his appearance in court (like that of Slobodan Milosevic at a Yugoslav war crimes trial) would take some of the gloss off his public standing.
Fourthly, a proper trial would help bring some sense of closure to the next-of-kin and friends of the victims in the US and elsewhere.
If bin Laden were killed without a proper sifting of the evidence, there would always be the doubt as to whether he was truly the guilty person.
Finally, such a trial would be a reaffirmation of the importance of the international rule of law at a time of international lawlessness.
It would help maintain the momentum - seen, for example, with the ad hoc Yugoslav and Rwandan war crimes trials and the progress towards creating a permanent International Criminal Court - to establish better mechanisms for enforcing international criminal law.
Nothing can compensate for the loss of life on September 11. But the deaths could be seen eventually as a monument in the creation of a better world order.
* Dr Keith Suter is a senior fellow of the Global Business Network Australia.
Map: Opposing forces in the war against terror
Afghanistan facts and links
Full coverage: Terror in America
