The display of force centred around a coalition maritime force (from Australia, Britain, France, United States and New Zealand) that included submarines, a cruiser, a destroyer, frigates, attendant support ships and was supported by Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) air combat and support aircraft.
The roles of the maritime force deployed to East Timor
included escort and close protection for transport ships, the identification and monitoring of all shipping and air contacts around East Timor, afloat combat support for ground forces, and use of embarked helicopters on reconnaissance patrols of shorelines and coastal waters. As well, maritime forces provided large-scale humanitarian assistance, which included medical aid, restoration of electrical power, the cleaning and
reconstruction of damaged buildings and repair of
infrastructure.
The full role of RAAF combat forces remains classified. The RAAF were used to send a powerful message to
Indonesia that Australia possessed an air combat
capability of such quality that any Indonesian air or
maritime attack on INTERFET would carry a heavy cost.
RAAF F18s, F111s and PC9s (in the forward air control
role) were on standby, available at readiness and issued with daily tasking orders. RNZAF Skyhawks transiting through the area were immediately available to support the RAAF. Other Skyhawks, maintained at a high state of readiness, could have been used to supplement the RAAF maritime strike and close air support capabilities had the intensity of conflict in East Timor escalated a notch. RAAF Orions flew anti-submarine patrols. Other air forces positioned aircraft. These details remain classified.
Ground Force Role
Ground forces do not operate in isolation, but require the security shield and support provided by fighter cover, surface warship protection and sea/air transport. East Timor was a truly joint operation in all respects.
Ground forces played an important role in deterring
attacks from militias/special forces and in restoring peace and security for the people of East Timor. This role has been described extensively elsewhere.
East Timor reinforced lessons learnt on other
peacemaking operations. These lessons include the
importance of maintaining deployable (with sufficient
logistic and strategic transport) forces at a high state of readiness; that ground forces must provide their own protection, mobility and fire power and be able to call in heavier naval gun fire support and close air support at short notice; all ground forces must be able to interoperate with forces from other states as well as the other services (navy and air force).
East Timor Worked Because Force Elements From Diverse Countries Could Work Together
INTERFET functioned in the crucial first week because
the Australian armed forces could interoperate with
diverse contingents drawn from Britain, France, New
Zealand and the United States. These states provided the core of both the maritime and ground contribution to INTERFET. This capacity to interoperate is the
consequence of years of shared training, exercising, the standardisation of doctrine and operating procedures and the operating of compatible equipment.
Only Balanced Forces Have The Flexibility Needed For Peacekeeping
Each of the Single Services (navy, army, air force)
maintains a balanced (combat, combat support and
logistics) force structure and capabilities. Each of the Single Services force structure and capabilities provides the cornerstone that underpins Joint (that is where the one or more Services works with each other) Combined (where a Single Service works with counterparts from another country) Operations. East Timor emphatically reinforced the enduring relevance of this approach to force structure and capability planning. The most important contributors to INTERFET maintain balanced forces.
If New Zealand did not have balanced forces it could not have meaningfully contributed to East Timor.
The NZDF’s force structure and capability mix provided
the full range of force elements that were directly usable in East Timor (frigates, tanker, special forces, infantry group, transport aircraft, maritime patrol and general purpose helicopters). Had the conflict escalated a notch, the NZDF possessed the capabilities (artillery, air combat) to provide essential reinforcement to the Australian Defence Force.
Equipment Quality More Important Than
Age
Forces deployed on peacekeeping operations should be
equipped with world-class equipment. The issue at stake is not the age of equipment, but its performance. The RNZN, NZ Army and RNZAF all deployed some old
equipment into East Timor. HMNZS Canterbury is
thirty years old (and performed well), the NZ Army’s
APCs and radios are of a similar age. The recently
refurbished APCs, while old, were the best performers in theatre – thanks to a recent upgrade. In contrast the very old radios were inadequate. They were both old and unreliable. The Hercules transport aircraft and Iroquois helicopters were also very old (without much effect on performance though maintenance rates were higher than for refurbished or new aircraft).
All Services Relevant
The NZDF’s Single Services each provided contributions
to East Timor that were self reliant and relevant in the face of the threat to INTERFET from Indonesian naval, ground and air elements, could work in a demanding environment isolated by sea and air, and in a total joint-combined operating environment.
Approximately 70% of RNZN, 45% of the (regular) NZ Army and 56% of RNZAF capabilities were directly used in East Timor.
A very small proportion of the NZ Army’s Territorial
Force (mainly medical specialists) was used in East
Timor. East Timor illustrates that the RNZN needs a
four frigate navy to maintain two frigates on station at any one time (the RNZN was tasked to simultaneously
provide a frigate to East Timor and another to the
Multinational Interception Forces in the Gulf), and that the full range of the RNZN’s, NZ Army’s and RNZAF’s capabilities would have been relevant to INTERFET had the conflict escalated.
The planning and movement of combat and logistic force
elements to East Timor absorbed a considerable
proportion of each Services planning and logistics
capabilities.
NZDF Is Adept At Joint Force Planning And Operations
A Joint Force Commander appointed by the Chief of Defence Force undertook NZDF planning for East Timor.
Co-operation between the NZDF Joint Force Commander and his Australian counterpart was smooth. All NZDF
force elements were able to interoperate with force elements drawn from differing Single Services from a wide range of countries.
Closer Defence Relations
New Zealand’s commitment to the Closer Defence Arrangement (CDR) with Australia is driven by strategic
imperatives that underpin both countries strategic and defence interests.
Defending Australia
Advocates of an army first approach to New Zealand’s
defence (with the navy and air force reduced to logistics and transport roles) assume that an army centred contribution will be wanted by Australia. This
assumption is based on a misreading of the realities that underpin strategic thinking for the defence of Australia.
Any attack on Australia will have to traverse the sizeable air-sea gap to its North West and its North. Australian strategic planners have long accepted that the best place to stop an attack on Australia is as far from its shores as possible.
This is why submarines, warships and fighter aircraft
supported by sophisticated long-range early warning and
intelligence-gathering capabilities are central to
Australian defence thinking. The role of ground forces is to secure from direct attack Australia’s vital
infrastructure supporting the defence of the North.
Australia has the ground forces it needs for this role.
Australia’s strategic dilemma is that it has an enormous sea and land area to patrol but only the resources of a smaller state.
Australia alone lacks the air and sea power to defend itself. The United States can fight one large (Gulf war type) and one small (Kosovo type) of war
simultaneously while also maintaining its security commitments to Europe, the Middle East, Japan and South Kore, that collectively cover most of the Northern
hemisphere. The United States is severely limited, by budget constraints, in its capacity to support other allies as well. If Australia is directly attacked the
United States may only provide limited military support. The United States expects smaller allies, especially in South East Asia, and Australia to take
responsibility for their own defence.
East Timor starkly illustrated the limits of the United
States capacity to support a smaller ally not covered by its core security umbrella.
This is why New Zealand ANZAC frigates, perhaps F16s and Orions are so important to Australia.
New Zealand has the capacity to add an extra 20% to Australia’s capacity to defend itself.
In this context, if New Zealand decides to commit to a
purely ground force contribution to the defence of
Australia, Wellington would be ironically offering a
capability that is not central, and takes an enormous
logistic effort to move and sustain. (There are sound
arguments for New Zealand strengthening its ground
forces but these are not directly linked with the defence of Australia).
If New Zealand wants to genuinely contribute to the
defence of Australia it should continue to provide sea and air combat forces. If New Zealand decides to withdraw from providing sea and air combat contribution, Australia will be left alone to defend itself. At the heart of the F16 issue is a decision. Does New Zealand want to help Australia?
Ultimately, New Zealand’s defence rests on the defence of Australia. If Australia goes down New Zealand will surely go with it.
