The outcome, as it was 1972, was next to nothing, at least as far as gangs are concerned.
Of the various laws that were introduced in mid-late 1990s, some were scarcely, if ever, used and those that were used, were used more often against people not in gangs. The most used provision, by a long way, landed on gang members or associates just 9.5 per cent of the time.
After studying those laws, and knowing how political such measures become, I wrote that future gang legislation should have a strong evidentiary basis, have clearly defined goals, and should allow objective testing of success and failure. I also wrote that they should take into account issues of universal rights and broader justice issues, including impacts on Māori.
I should have saved my ink.
But that’s not the only lesson. The violent events that sparked the 1990s legislative drive against gangs were quelled by good policing. For that reason, the police response to the new government’s agenda is an important one.
The police have launched a National Gang Unit, made up of co-ordination and intel at police national headquarters, as well as frontline staff across the 12 police districts.
Concerns around the police taking from Peter to give to Paul are valid, but the new unit does have the potential to have a significant impact.
Unlike the government, the police have created data in order to test their success. Those data show what we all perhaps instinctively know, that gangs are seriously overrepresented in crime data.
But policies anywhere are only as good as their implementation and, to my mind at least, there are some important considerations. Too often we lazily look across the ditch to see what the Aussies are up to. But anybody who thinks Australia has a better police service than New Zealand is poorly read or ill-informed. New South Wales, for example, named their gang unit ‘Strike Force Raptor’, which sounds suspiciously like a gang and at times acts like one, too.
New Zealand also has experience with specialist units targeting gangs, the earliest of which were task forces of the 1970s. They became notorious for rough-house tactics and diminished trust and confidence in the police.
How the National Gang Unit can make an impact
How things are done is often as important as what’s done. Real success, in my opinion, will only come from deliberate, surgical engagement. I am firmly of the belief that the focus – and force – of the unit needs to be on the groups that are causing acute community concern and not simply all gangs in the community. In part, this is because of limited resources – you get more bang for buck when you’re not spread too thinly – but it’s much more than that.
If you quickly target those most deserving after a violent event, for example, the police demonstrate the direct consequences of the negative actions, not just to the gang involved but to all of the gangs watching. If, however, after a violent gang event, all gangs in the area are targeted by the unit, there’s no incentive for a gang to behave one way or another.
The same goes for gang tangi or road trips. If these events run badly and there is public disorder, hammer them and increase the pressure on their next event. If the gang event goes smoothly, however, then show them greater leeway at the next.
This form of effective targeting means that gangs appreciate their behaviour can have either negative of positive consequences, and if this is communicated clearly, and then fairly and unambiguously enforced, it will adjust gang behaviour for the better. In effect, the gangs will begin to police themselves.
You won’t hear this nuanced talk from the politicians because it doesn’t get votes. It’s also why their policies fail.
