By Greg Ansley
DARWIN - Reports that a guerrilla militia army may be forming in West Timor raises more potential dangers for the United Nations peacemaking force.
But they are just one possible threat beyond the prospect of a long and drawn-out jungle campaign that could enmesh New Zealand and Australia for years to come.
The pro-independence Falantil forces, at present biding their time in cantonments throughout East Timor, have yet to re-enter a civil war that has been fought for decades and was the trigger for Indonesian annexation in 1975.
And there are suggestions that the lack of a formal political and administrative structure beyond the United Nations mandate given to Interfet commander Major-General Peter Cosgrove risks military confrontation with Indonesia. And that the same lack could potentially expose peacemakers to war crimes charges.
One worrying threat lies in the militia splinter groups who crossed the border into West Timor as the UN forces landed in Dili, taking with them politically determined fighters trained by the Indonesian Army (TNI) and Kompassus special forces.
Protected by what is only a paper border, they face only restraints placed on them by Jakarta. They are, at least for the present, immune from pursuit by Interfet forces bound both by tight restrictions and the fear of provoking an already resentful and stridently nationalistic Indonesia.
"What we hope will happen is that the Indonesian Government will not support the activities of a guerrilla movement, so that East Timor is not going to be faced with an unconventional [warfare] threat in the future," said the senior New Zealand officer in East Timor, Colonel Martyn Dunne.
"What we want is the militia to either re-integrate back into East Timor or leave the people to get on with their lives.
"The critical thing is to ensure that any support or hint of Indonesian support for the militia is withdrawn."
But while there is no clear evidence yet of either a serious militia campaign against UN forces or Indonesian backing for a new guerrilla campaign - covert or otherwise - the complexities of East Timor make any early assessments difficult.
General Cosgrove is plagued by uncertainties, including:
* Political developments in Jakarta and the policy of its future government towards an independent East Timor.
* Jakarta's ability to control its forces, given the problems with locally recruited soldiers and other "rogue elements" which openly supported and assisted the murder, terror and destruction the militias inflicted on East Timor.
* The real intentions of the militias, and the prospect of being sucked into a long campaign of counter-insurgency.
* Whether the Falantil pro-independence groups, with thousands of well-armed, well-led and well-supported fighters, will rejoin battle with the militias, adding a dangerous fourth force to an already brittle peace.
* The inability to move in and disarm all potential combatants and ensure that only Interfet is an effective armed force in East Timor.
Behind Dili to the west lie the eight regions the militias want to carve off from East Timor and add to Indonesian West Timor, using a continuation of the terror and violence that razed the island in the bloody aftermath of the August 30 independence vote.
A political front has been formed by the leaders of the most powerful militia groups, including the Aitarak who scorched Dili, the Bessa Merah Puthi, Laksaur and Mahidi.
Their potential military force remains uncertain.
One intelligence source said there was little doubt the militias were regrouping across the border, possibly planning a campaign using militiamen still in the east for intelligence and support.
"I believe that possibility is the biggest threat facing any stabilisation force in the area," he said.
The only law at present is that of the guns carried by Interfet troops.
Guerrillas add stress to tightrope
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