The fall-out from this actual chain of events in the United Kingdom in 2001 was devastating. The culling of six million animals followed with an overall cost to the British economy thought to be $16 billion dollars.
While there are significant differences between the United Kingdom and New Zealand farming systems, the impact of a similar scenario in New Zealand could be equally destructive and, perhaps, more so -- because of our economic reliance on animal products as the prime overseas income earner.
Last year, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) published a report on the economic impact of an FMD incursion here. For the largest scale scenario modelled, it was estimated the cost to the economy would be a net present value loss, in real Gross Domestic Product of $16.2 billion over an eight-year period.
While an impact of this magnitude would be felt at a national level, the costs would fall most heavily on the primary sector; farms, meat and milk processors, other businesses and the communities that collectively make up our rural sector.
Once an FMD incursion is confirmed, New Zealand would immediately lose access to overseas markets for some animal products until FMD is eradicated and confidence of our trading partners has been regained.
Consequently, farmers -- the primary processors they supply and businesses and communities they support -- would need to deal with huge economic and social disruption resulting from a major income loss for a considerable period, including possible livestock loss.
Because of the severity of the threat, there is significant work being done to develop processes and systems needed to effectively detect, respond to and recover from an FMD incursion.
This has taken a number of years, initially by MAF and, subsequently, by its successor MPI, which has the protection of the primary sector from biological risks as one of its four key areas of focus.
MPI, with expertise in managing incursions, will lead any FMD response and the ministry has invested a significant amount of resource into developing systems for this.
However, recognising that any successful response measures will involve many other stakeholders, MPI's FMD preparedness programme has expanded to a partnership with representatives from the pastoral sector -- including the Federation -- and other government agencies.
As a result, a number of projects -- designed to materially improve our FMD preparedness -- took place in 2014. This work will continue in 2015 so, by year's end, the country is well placed to deal with the risk. Should any FMD incursion occur, the New Zealand government will take all measures necessary to eradicate the disease so access to overseas markets can be restored as soon as possible and the impacts on the New Zealand economy, businesses and communities are minimised.
To achieve this, and from lessons other countries learned with managing FMD, a number of critical steps have been factored in.
MPI principal advisor Andre van Halderen told The National Farming Review that diagnosing FMD was not necessarily straightforward.
"It has to be diagnosed and officially confirmed, as the symptoms animals display may be similar to other diseases that do not require any response measures to be taken. This requires samples to be taken from suspected animals and tested in a specialist laboratory.
"We don't have any live (infectious) FMD viruses held in New Zealand. Testing would be carried out using methods that don't require a live virus to be used," he said.
Importantly, the first case of FMD detected is not necessarily the first case in the country, as other animals may have been infected but yet to be detected as having FMD.
The time delay between first infection and detection -- called the "silent spread" period -- is typically 14 to 20 days, or even longer.
"This makes FMD control more difficult, particularly where infected animals have been transported within the country, and means that early detection is critical to getting the disease under control," Mr van Halderen said.
Once confirmed, the next critical response measures are to minimise the further spread of the disease and to eradicate the virus from those properties where it occurs.
To do this effectively, the scale and nature of the response measures will need the Government to use Emergency Powers available to it under the Biosecurity Act 1993 and its secondary regulations to ensure the necessary measures can be put in place in a timely manner.
The primary tool to control and manage the spread of disease is the issuing, under the Biosecurity Act, of a Controlled Area Notice -- National Livestock Movement Standstill -- an innocuous sounding title that will have huge impacts on the farming community. The notice would prohibit the movement of any FMD susceptible animal -- cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and deer -- or their semen or embryos, anywhere in the country for a significant period -- probably several weeks.
"While it is in force, a permit would be needed for any movement of any susceptible animals (from their location at the time of the notice being issued)," Mr van Halderen said.
The notice is designed to establish control by:
* Defining how risky goods are in terms of transmitting FMD, for example high, medium and low risk. Susceptible animals, for example, are high-risk goods.
* Assigning locations with a risk profile -- i.e. "High Risk" and "At Risk" depending on their geographical closeness to known (or likely) locations of FMD infection.
More stringent controls (Restricted Place Notices) would be imposed on farms or other places where an FMD infection is found or suspected.
By managing the flow of animals and other materials that could spread it, the notice achieves two critical things.
"It will minimise the risk of FMD continuing to spread to other locations and, secondly, (by using tools such as NAIT and ASDs) it buys time to allow for the tracing of the movements of any known infected animals.
"As a result, any susceptible animals that infected animals may have come into contact with can be identified and the infection risk managed."
Next, from a disease control perspective, the virus must be destroyed where it is known to occur. Unfortunately for farmers, this requires the culling of all susceptible livestock on any property where the disease is confirmed.
Even if only a single case is detected, all cattle, sheep, goats, pigs or deer on that property will have to be humanely destroyed and the carcasses disposed of in a manner that does not spread disease. This requirement does not apply to horses, dogs, cats or poultry.
No-one can accurately predict the scale of the incursion or what management of it would entail. From both an operational and logistical viewpoint, however, it presents huge challenges.
Mr van Halderen said: "There will be a multitude of tasks and operations needed to effectively manage and eradicate FMD. This will be achieved using a well defined, structured and single scalable incident management system involving many government agencies through a so-called 'Whole of Government Response'."
One of the key organisations tasked with managing this will be the National Biosecurity Capability Network (NBCN), a joint initiative between MPI and AsureQuality. Its role is to assemble skilled people, equipment and develop networks providing operational resources to help deal with biosecurity emergencies such as FMD.
Overall, the response to any incursion will involve a large number of people and resources. It will require all the component's parts of a complex suite of programmes to be thoroughly executed under trying circumstances - including permitting and movement control, disinfection, carcase disposal, compensation and communication.
In the midst of all this activity, it would be easy to forget the biggest impacts will be on farmers, their families and those whose jobs are at risk as a consequence of the incursion.
Everyone would be involved in the response measures - managers, field staff to industry organisations such as the Federation - all acutely aware of the pressures farming families, and their communities, would face.
Considerable efforts will be made around helping people manage what will be an immensely stressful situation, including the provision of services during the recovery phase of operations.
The desired result is the re-opening of our overseas markets for our animal products that will mark the beginning of a return to business as usual (once we have regained officially recognised FMD-free status). It will, however, be quite some time until this is fully achieved, as economic impacts and the emotional scars left by the incursion will linger long after business has resumed.
Any FMD incursion will have a long-lasting impact on the economy, primary sector businesses, rural communities and the New Zealand psyche.
Good biosecurity practices - to minimise the chances of an incursion occurring and maximise the chances of its early detection - is the best defence against biosecurity threats.
As such good practices (by reducing animal health management and other costs) also generally provide direct financial benefits, it is a precaution that every New Zealand farmer should seriously consider implementing.
