Paul Buchanan: Zaoui between a rock and a hard place

Paul Buchanan

Whatever the specific composition of the incoming New Zealand Government, the Inspector General of the Security Intelligence Service will likely rule within six months about the validity of the 2002 security risk certificate issued against Ahmed Zaoui. If historical precedent prevails, the IG will rule that the certificate was issued correctly.

Mr Zaoui's refugee appeal will then be sent to the Immigration Minister for a decision within 48 hours. Given the state of coalition politics, that could adversely impact, from his point of view, on governmental interpretation of the merit of his appeal.

Until recently the situation was not unduly problematic for Mr Zaoui and his legal team. The Immigration Minister is obliged to take Mr Zaoui's human rights - specifically, his fear of physical retribution for his past political activities - into consideration when deciding whether to deport him to Algeria or elsewhere.

Regardless of the tilt of the New Zealand Government on immigration and refugee issues, given the nature of Algerian politics, Mr Zaoui's safety in Algeria could not be guaranteed (since he is under a death sentence passed against him in absentia in 1985). That is, until now.

The comparative political context in which his refugee appeal will be heard has been altered. The New Zealand elections may make it more likely that the Government will continue a hard-line stance against Muslim asylum seekers. There are also signs of change in Algeria.

After more than a decade of civil war in which over 100,000 people died, the Algerian regime has just held a national referendum on an amnesty law for most of those involved in the violence. This includes members of the Islamic Armed Group (GIA).


The GIA is opposed to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a non-violent political coalition to which Mr Zaoui belongs in exile and under whose banner he was elected to the Algerian parliament in 1991.

When the military annulled the elections once it became clear the FIS had obtained a parliamentary majority, violence flared, the FIS splintered, and many of its adherents fled into exile, Mr Zaoui included. The details of his travels have been well documented, and the story of his quest for asylum in New Zealand is a cautionary tale of government duplicity, faulty intelligence, bureaucratic obstructionism and cultural xenophobia pitted against the will of one desperate man and his band of Kiwi supporters. Although he has scored some important legal victories and won partial freedom in his desired place of refuge, the new problem for Mr Zaoui is a result of the Algerian referendum, and the likely responses of the New Zealand Government to it.

Algeria is what is known in comparative politics as a liberalising military authoritarian regime. It is incrementally staging a top-down transition to limited competitive electoral rule. This process is characterised by a gradual "softening" of authoritarian rule, or what the Brazilians called "descompressao": a gradual "decompression" of civil and political society after the acute pressures and tensions of the past. Algeria's process of liberalisation began in 1999 with the election of civilian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The military now governs from behind the scenes and proposes to gradually re-open Algerian political debate and party competition within clearly specified boundaries (which will severely limit the ability to form religion-based political parties such as the FIS).

The situation today is quite different than the one Mr Zaoui faced in 1993 when he went into exile. Even though the referendum was manipulated by the Bouteflika government (which did not allow independent assessment of the vote or public debate about the details of the amnesty law), it received majority support from those who did vote (with voter turnout figures a matter of dispute between the government and foreign observers).

In addition, there are fewer than 1000 Islamic guerrillas left in Algeria (most members of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, an al Qaeda linked outfit) and their activities have been seriously curtailed by a counter-insurgency campaign that relied extensively on state terror for its initial success, but which now has been scaled back and replaced with selective repression and political inducements for civilian cooperation against the insurgents.

Algerian society is exhausted, driven to its knees by the cumulative effects of the armed struggle, pervasive governmental corruption and high levels of unemployment, poverty and social inequality in the world's eighth largest oil-based economy. There is little interest in protracting the conflict, with people more prone to adopting strategies of survival amid a climate of general political indifference. Under such conditions there is little urge to take up arms against the authoritarian state, just a desire to submit and be left alone.

As a result, the Algerian political environment today is seemingly more benign than the one Mr. Zaoui left behind years ago. This means that once the Inspector General of the SIS makes his decision, should he uphold the security risk certificate issued against Mr Zaoui, the Immigration Minister can make the argument that Mr Zaoui no longer has a reasonable basis to fear for his life and can be returned home.

It should be noted that the Salafist Group and FIS (which claims to be the legitimate government in exile) have not accepted the terms of the amnesty law and rejected the results of the referendum (which gives discretionary control powers to Mr Bouteflika when implementing the law and which does not include restoration of the legal status of the FIS as a political party). That means that, as far as the Algerian regime is concerned, the Salafists and FIS have excluded themselves from the protections awarded by the amnesty law.

Therein lies the crux of Mr Zaoui's problem. He belongs to an outlawed political party in exile, one that has called into question an amnesty law that the Bouteflika government is using as an example of its commitment to political liberalisation and the restoration of broad-based freedoms of association, human rights and civil liberties. With the legitimating mantle of the amnesty law, the regime can argue that its opposition in common with the Salafist Group offers proof that the FIS is not interested in national reconciliation, and can therefore continue to resist pressures to re-incorporate the FIS into Algerian political life.

But even if the FIS accepted the referendum and reached an agreement with the Bouteflika government on conditions for its return to Algeria, that does not mean that Mr Zaoui would have no reason to fear. To the contrary, the government has shown little ability or desire to control the paramilitary squads and other private purveyors of death that continue to operate around the margins of the liberalisation campaign. These agencies serve as control devices that could be activated when and should things begin to slip away from the government's preferred path towards its prescribed political opening. That is where the president's powers of discretionary control get their muscle. The reason is simple: the Bouteflika government is the elected civilian face of a military-dominated regime in which a dark network of repressive agents working behind the scenes and in the shadows of legality have a decisive say in the course of events.

In that light the forced return of an FIS member from exile could well be seen by these covert agencies as an opportunity to remind the population of the price for continued non-cooperation with the liberalising government. Mr Zaoui has justified reason to believe that he could become the target of such a "braking" exercise.

Thus, the context in which his appeal will be heard could be doubly unfortunate for Ahmed Zaoui. On the one hand, the likely disposition of those charged with reviewing his case for asylum in New Zealand will be unsympathetic. On the other hand, appearances can be deceiving, especially in a process of authoritarian regime liberalisation where universal amnesty guarantees offer little individual protection from the predations of actors who operate in the shadows of the liberalisation programme. If the Algerian referendum is interpreted by the next New Zealand Government as a sign that things have changed for the better in Mr Zaoui's homeland, then it is likely he will have to confront those demons in the shadows, alone.

* Paul G. Buchanan is director of the Working Group on Alternative Security Perspectives at the University of Auckland. His latest book, With Distance Comes Perspective, was published in September by the Digital Printing Group.