Most Kiwis have two largely unconnected images of a World Trade Organisation (WTO) meeting: a dry interview with Trade Negotiations Minister Jim Sutton, insisting that our future depends on the success of the Doha round of trade liberalisation, and sensational pictures of protests and riot police.
This snapshot masks the highly dysfunctional state of the WTO and the growing collaboration between governments of poorer countries and non-government organisations (NGOs) and social movements.
The crisis facing the institution was obvious to anyone at last week's sixth ministerial conference in Hong Kong. Throughout the five days the WTO was on life support. Even veteran journalists who champion free trade were writing its obituary.
In the preceding weeks, expectations had been "recalibrated" to avoid the appearance of another failure. The final text fell short even of that.
The few decisions that were taken reflected a trade-off among the inner circle or "new quad" comprising the United States, European Union, India and Brazil. These were agreed in the secret invitation-only "green room" and presented to the majority of members in the closing hours as a fait accompli.
The outcome mocked claims of a Doha "development" round, offering vague promises, deceptive "concessions" and missable deadlines. Many of the world's poorest countries were coerced into accepting a text that they had vigorously resisted.
Throughout the week, those relegated to the outer circle relied on the accredited NGOs and social movements as allies.
International networks such as Our World is Not for Sale had the capacity to collect, analyse and share intelligence, critique national positions, debunk claims and produce sign-on statements within hours.
Stunts and protest activities were staged in front of delegates and media. Many delegations privately expressed their appreciation; some joined the action; others sought meetings to develop complementary strategies.
This development reflects three important changes since the first WTO ministerial conference was held in Singapore in 1996.
Then, the decisions were framed by the "old quad" of the US, EU, Japan and Canada, determined in the "green room" and communicated to the rest. India was their main antagonist.
Few other developing countries understood the complex array of agreements that emerged from the Uruguay round. It is not surprising that the WTO's richer members, including New Zealand, believed they could continue shaping the rules through successive rounds of negotiations.
A decade later, extensive empirical research by NGOs, think tanks and critical academics have exposed the WTO's failure to deliver the promised gains for most poorer countries.
Even the World Bank's latest research concedes that predictions of substantial poverty reduction from the Doha round were based on a "fanciful scenario". It suggests that even big cuts in tariffs and subsidies would benefit fewer than 1 per cent of the world's people living below the poverty line. Hong Kong fell well short of that.
Second, global economic and political power has shifted. This is reflected in the pivotal role that "developing" countries Brazil and India, as leaders in the Group of 20 agriculture exporters, played in the collapse of the Cancun ministerial conference in 2003. In return they secured a seat at the inner table.
There was never any guarantee that these large, export-focused developing countries would champion the interests of poorer developing countries, as this week has proved. Hence, the alliances with the NGOs.
Third, the WTO's agreements on agriculture, industrial production, natural resources, services, intellectual property, government procurement and investment intrude deep into the policy choices of its 149 members. Existing and proposed rules require governments to reshape their policies and laws to fit the global market model.
In many countries of Latin America, Africa and Asia these neoliberal policies are intensely unpopular. They can be literally a matter of life and death. Governments rise, fall and are sometimes overthrown by mobilisations of people's movements.
Leftist delegations in Hong Kong made those connections. Venezuela, for example, traced its opposition to proposals on services to the role that US corporations who controlled the country's energy services played in fomenting popular unrest.
This factor links the protests outside to the negotiations inside. The 4500 peasant farmers from La Via Campesina who came to Hong Kong were on the streets and inside the meeting, where European and American farmers sought to influence the negotiations.
Addressing a press conference after the December 17 protests, French farmer Jose Bove insisted that militant dissent was a legitimate option when decisions over people's livelihoods are relocated from national democratic processes to a remote international organisation that is undemocratic and excludes any role for citizens.
"We are not terrorists, not criminals, we are farmers and workers who are fighting for our rights. That's why we came here to this building, to open the doors and say to the delegates, 'Come and listen to what we have to tell you, what the farmers are saying, what the workers are saying, about food sovereignty, about dumping'."
The relationship between the governments of poorer countries and a spectrum of non-government organisations and social movements which operate both within and outside the WTO is not without its tensions.
But it may prove to be the most significant outcome from the Hong Kong ministerial. As the Doha negotiations move back to Geneva, this relationship will play an increasingly pivotal role in deciding the future of the WTO.
* Dr Jane Kelsey was an accredited NGO representative to the Hong Kong ministerial meeting and as part of ARENA is active in the Our World is Not for Sale network.
<EM>Jane Kelsey:</EM> Poor and outsiders find new friends
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