In February, it will be five years since the collapse of the deficient Canterbury Television building in Christchurch. The anniversary of the disaster will no doubt be painful for the families and friends of the 115 individuals killed when the six-storey concrete tower failed during the magnitude 6.3 earthquake on February 22, 2011. If, as seems likely, no decision is made by then whether any charges will be laid, there also will be a justified sense of frustration no one has been held accountable for the tragedy - despite millions spent investigating it.
Last week, police announced the outcome of their CTV criminal inquiry was taking longer than expected. No decision was likely until next year. Given charges of manslaughter could result from the investigation, it is no surprise police are advancing cautiously. Their approach has included computer modelling and testing replicas of the flawed building. Detective Superintendent Peter Read said the work covered "complex technical matters involving outside experts". The task, Mr Read advised, had taken longer than anticipated.
This is regrettable. There have been a number of investigations since the catastrophic event. A Royal Commission moved to its conclusion in little over 20 months. Its final report - including translations in Thai, Korean, Japanese and Chinese - came out in December, 2012.
The commission found the CTV building collapsed because ground motion during the February earthquake was very intense and because of flaws in the engineering design and construction. The building relied on two walls to resist shocks generated by earthquakes. Shortcomings in its design and construction meant these two walls did not function as the designer intended.
The commission said structural engineer David Harding, employed by Alan Reay Consulting, designed the CTV building in 1986 but was left largely unsupervised by principal Alan Reay despite Harding's limited experience designing multi-level buildings. The commissioners found the design had non-complying aspects because Harding was working "beyond his competence" and Reay did not review the final plans. The report found this led in turn to a design that was "deficient in a number of important respects".