Editorial: Confronting Islamists does not mean aiding Assad

Abdel-Majed Abdel Bary has been linked with Jihad John, the man who beheaded American Journalist James Foley

At some stage, a vigorous and viable response to the threat posed by the Islamic State was always going to be necessary. The jihadists' grisly beheading of American journalist James Foley has merely brought that forward.

It has also, however, highlighted the difficulties in deciding what form that reaction should take. Most problematically, there are increasing suggestions in the United States that some sort of accommodation should be struck with Syria's ruler, Bashar al-Assad, to defeat the Islamic State.

Just a year ago, after his use of chemical weapons against his own people, he was a tyrant whom the West was intent on toppling through a bombing campaign. Now, Mr Assad is viewed in some quarters as very much the lesser of two evils.

But embracing him would be folly. Mr Assad's regime is no less brutal now, and even if the Islamic State were extinguished, his continued presence would foster conflict. Indeed, the very rise of the jihadists was to some extent a cynical ploy by Mr Assad to get the support of most Syrians and the West. Until recently, his forces focused their assaults on non-Islamist rebels, allowing the group that eventually formed the Islamic State to grow rapidly from a marginalised offshoot of al-Qaeda.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the West's big mistake in Syria was not doing everything to support the moderate rebels when it had the chance. A similar error was made in Iraq with the failure to deter the Shia-leaning Prime Minister, Nouri al-Maliki, from alienating the country's Sunni minority.

Together, these misjudgments created fertile ground for the Islamic State to claim large swathes of Iraq and Syria.

It is tempting to think the West could co-operate with Mr Assad to remove that threat. Thereafter, so the theory goes, it would cajole him into offering his moderate opponents places in a reformed regime. But such an outcome would be a long shot if only because it would be so out of keeping with Mr Assad's customary conduct. One certain consequence of an accommodation would be a flood of recruits to the Islamic State's banner. Mr Assad would be seen as a puppet, and the West would have an even bigger fight on its hands.

An alternative strategy must be pursued. That involves orchestrating a broad coalition of forces against the Islamic State. In the first instance, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces currently taking the flight to the jihadists must be trained and armed. The American airstrikes that have enabled them to reclaim a limited amount of territory in the north of Iraq will be much less effective in heavily populated areas. A similar arming of moderate rebels in Syria must also take place.

The departure of Mr al-Maliki after eight years of fomenting division in Iraq offers an opportunity in that country. His replacement, Haider al-Abadi, a moderate Shia, seems intent on building a nation inclusive of all religious and ethnic groups. Strong steps in this direction and a rearming and training of the Iraqi security forces would render unlikely a repeat of the military disasters that have emboldened the Islamic State.

But its defeat will not come easily. As much as it has become a universal byword for brutality, it has proved itself to be a skilful and determined fighting force.

Outstanding diplomacy will also be required to keep its opponents focused on its demise. But the West has no option but to confront the threat. If it does not, the Islamic State will eagerly foster terrorism in some shape or form. In such circumstances, reaching out to the strongman of the region may seem logical. Not, though, in the case of someone as rightly reviled as Bashar al-Assad.

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