KEY POINTS:
It would come as no great surprise to Corrections chief executive Barry Matthews to find himself being elbowed towards the door by a politician.
Mr Matthews, 62, has been there before.
In the last year of his previous job, commissioner of the Western Australia police, he was privately asked to resign by the state's police minister.
That's not too dissimilar to his current predicament - Corrections Minister Judith Collins calling for his head after a damning audit report this week.
It comes with the territory.
Consider this: "Inquiries and apologies are not enough. It is time for [the Corrections chief] to accept that his lack of responsible leadership has put the community at risk. It is time for Mark Byers to resign."
Mark Byers was Mr Matthews' predecessor as Corrections CEO, and the quote is from a 2002 press statement by New Zealand First MP Ron Mark in which Mr Mark said, "I didn't think Corrections could get any worse."
Mr Byers didn't resign. A longtime public servant, he retired three years later after nine years at the helm (he was appointed in 1995 when Corrections was set up as a stand-alone department).
Mr Matthews refused to fall on his sword in Western Australia. The police minister's request for him to go followed a Royal Commission of Inquiry into corruption in the state's police force which found pockets of rot, but nothing comparable to revelations in Queensland and New South Wales.
Mr Matthews, who yesterday ruled out resigning as head of Corrections, has said he didn't quit in Western Australia because the request to do so didn't relate to his performance and because he wasn't a quitter.
He'd made a commitment to the job for five years "and I stick to my commitments", he told the Herald six months before he was appointed to the Corrections post in December 2004.
One difference this time is that the Auditor-General's report relates squarely to the department's performance under Mr Matthews. The report - which comes after Corrections claimed it had improved its parole management following its disastrous mishandling of Graeme Burton's parole - found the department was characterised by a consistent failure to meet requirements, and questioned its culture.
Another difference is that Judith Collins has publicly refused to express confidence in Mr Matthews.
That, says Professor Jonathan Boston, makes his position untenable.
"If a departmental CEO loses the confidence of their minister, they are going to have to be moved on sooner or later because they need to have an effective relationship."
Dr Boston, director of the School of Government at Victoria University, says this has been so even in cases where a personality clash undermined the relationship, or when the fault lay with the minister.
The issue of responsibility boils down to three types - vicarious, primary and personal (where personal issues make the public position untenable).
Mr Matthews has been chief executive for four years and is therefore vicariously responsible for the performance of his department.
"If he's not vicariously responsible, then who is?" Dr Boston asks.
"The minister? Had she been in the role for a few years she obviously would be, but she has just arrived."
"Primary responsibility" might sheet home to Mr Matthews if staff had reported shortcomings to him and he had failed to adequately respond, says Professor Boston, who points out he has not read the Auditor-General's report and therefore does not know the detail.
Appropriate penalty depended on such things as the time he had been in the position, seriousness of the problem and whether it is primarily a management issue (rather than government, where satisfactory performance is impossible due to inadequate resourcing).
In announcing he would not resign from his $375,000-a-year job, Mr Matthews said the department did not have enough resources. It would request funding to recruit more probation officers but if the money was granted, these additional officers would not be fully trained until mid-2011.
The Auditor-General's report acknowledged that staffing issues had "a significant effect" on managing offenders on parole, but noted that more probation officers would not fix all of the problems.
The ultimate responsibility for addressing Corrections' poor performance lies with the minister.
It appears Ms Collins' prescription involves replacing Mr Matthews, possibly for accountability and because she is not confident of improvement under his direction.
The decision on Mr Matthews' future lies with his employer, the State Services Commissioner, who is examining who is responsible for the failures noted in the Attorney-General's report.
Removing the chief executive will not resolve Corrections' problems. It may even create another.
The commissioner may also be pondering where to find a replacement able to take on a job that has proven difficult around the world.
Corrections dealt with difficult people whose numbers were growing, said Professor Boston. It had a difficult culture within the prison service and, in some areas, poor facilities.
"These are difficult tasks where it is very difficult to please people ... it's not a job you would imagine everyone would want."
Mr Matthews no doubt knew this when he applied for it. Ironically, he told the Herald on the eve of his return from Australia that he'd like a job with a little less profile.
But he used to tight spots. While New Zealand deputy commissioner of police, he acted to remove John Dewar (serving a prison term for obstructing the course of justice in his handling of rape complainant Louise Nicholas) as head of Rotorua's CIB.
Also notably, Mr Matthews was project manager for the ill-fated $130 million Incis computer installation which had to be abandoned.
"I used to wake up sweating," he recalled. "We'd resolve a problem and the next day another would crop up."
It may be a feeling with which he is again familiar.
THE AUDIT
100 case files studied
52 involved high-risk parolees
'Most cases' Corrections did not follow requirements, putting public safety at risk
20 recommendations made
