Chubb told the Coroners Court that SERT teams worked under police, and it was not uncommon for St John not to know when they had been requested, where they were, or what they were doing.
In response, Coroner Windley said: “My concern is that that creates a significant blind spot for St John, doesn’t it?”
“Isn’t it that these are critical resources in terms of closing that care gap for people who are dying and injured and being able to get a response in, and you’ve got no visibility about where they are and even if in fact they’ve been deployed?”
Chubb said he was not suggesting it was “okay” that St John did not know where SERT officers were but said it was the practice at the time.
He was not aware of any changes to the SERT policy since the terror attack.
Chubb told the coroner he thought it was “always nice to know” where resources were, to which she replied, “I would suggest it’s more than nice to know. I would suggest that St John needs to know”.
Windley said the court was concerned St John ambulance officers had to breach the organisation’s policy in order to get an emergency response in place.
“Do you agree that that’s fundamentally a problem?” she asked.
“Yes,” Chubb replied.
Earlier today, Chubb told counsel for families Kathryn Dalziel that the terror attack was a catastrophic event that he did not expect and was never prepared for.
“I don’t believe any of my colleagues were either, so it was fundamentally overwhelming,” he said.
The issues the inquest will examine over the next seven weeks include:
Events of March 15, 2019, from the commencement of the attack until the terrorist’s formal interview by police;
Response times and entry processes of police and ambulance officers at each mosque;
Triage and medical response at each mosque;
The steps that were taken to apprehend the offender;
The role of, and processes undertaken by, Christchurch Hospital in responding to the attack;
Co-ordination between emergency services and first responders;
Whether the terrorist had any direct assistance from any other person on March 15, 2019;
If raised by immediate family, and to the extent it can be ascertained, the final movements and time of death for each of the deceased;
The cause of death for each of the victims and whether any deaths could have been avoided;
Whether Al Noor Mosque emergency exit door in the southeast corner of the main prayer room failed to function during the attack and, if so, why?