An Armed Offenders Squad medic says he was not aware of a “load and go” strategy for police helping worshippers shot in the terror attack at Christchurch’s Linwood Islamic Centre, because ambulance paramedics were so stretched.
An inquest intothe March 2019 massacre has heard officers at the scene knew ambulances would be held up at nearby Al Noor Mosque - the scene of the gunman’s first rampage - and the chance of getting them to Linwood Ave was slim.
As a result, police used their own cars to rush the bullet-injured to hospital.
The Armed Offenders Squad (AOS) medic told the Coroners Court that while “time evaporated quickly” he was expecting ambulances and could not recall being told they were unlikely to come.
Thousands of flowers and messages of support were left in tribute to the Christchurch mosque terror attack victims. Photo / Alan Gibson
But the AOS officer said he would seriously consider such an approach if a similar situation happened again.
“It’s something that, as medics and staff of AOS, we would consider, essentially weighing up the benefits of load and go versus staying and treating or waiting for ambulance staff,” he said.
“It depends on the situation, there’s no hard and fast rule. There never can be.”
The court heard the AOS medic was in Christchurch on March 15 for a police training course, alongside specialist officers from Australia and Hong Kong.
They raced to Linwood to help when news of the shooting emerged.
The AOS member said he helped to clear cars from outside the mosque before directing other staff to give first aid to survivors with gunshot wounds to their backs, chests and lower bodies.
The inquest will examine the following 10 issues over six weeks:
Events of March 15, 2019 from the start of the attack until the terrorist’s formal interview by police
Response times and entry processes of police and ambulance officers at each mosque
Triage and medical response at each mosque
The steps that were taken to apprehend the offender
The role of, and processes undertaken by, Christchurch Hospital in responding to the attack
Co-ordination between emergency services and first responders
Whether the terrorist had any direct assistance from any other person on March 15, 2019
If raised by immediate family, and to the extent it can be ascertained, the final movements and time of death for each of the deceased
The cause of death for each of the victims and whether any deaths could have been avoided
Whether the Al Noor Mosque emergency exit door in the southeast corner of the main prayer room failed to function during the attack and, if so, why.
