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It is unlikely police could have prevented the massacre at Linwood Islamic Centre, even if they were aware of a threat against the mosque, an inquest has heard.
One of the police’s most senior tactical commanders is giving evidence as the inquest into the death of 51 worshippers at Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch on March 15, 2019, comes to the end of its sixth week.
The inquest earlier heard that a parliamentary staffer told a police call-taker eight minutes before the Linwood massacre that the terrorist had singled out the mosque in his manifesto.
As the shooting at Al Noor Mosque started around the same time, the call was buried, and police dispatchers and frontline officers never knew of it.
Seven people were murdered at Linwood Islamic Centre.
Armed police guard the Linwood Islamic Centre in the days after the shooting. Photo / Michael Craig
The senior Armed Offenders Squad commander, who cannot be identified, told the inquest officers were unlikely to be able to intervene, even if they had that information.
“It would’ve been great if they were able to - it would have been fantastic,” he said.
“However, given that seven-minute timeframe - I won’t use the word fanciful, but it’s idealistic to think that things can come together so quickly for frontline staff to respond and be effective in that short timeframe. Seven minutes is not a great deal of time.”
Once shots were reported at Linwood, it took armed officers only minutes to arrive.
Police counsel Jade Lancaster asked the senior police officer whether, if dispatch had been aware, anything could have been done to intercept the terrorist at Linwood between the parliamentary staffer’s call and the shooting beginning.
The crowds gathered in Hagley Park, Christchurch. Photo / Alan Gibson.
The dispatcher, Dara Taylor, previously told the court she would have immediately sent resources to the mosque to evacuate it.
The tactical expert said it was his opinion that AOS members would have “trouble” meeting that timeframe.
The first response would have had to be by frontline officers, and even if they were near the scene, they would still need time to prepare.
This would include putting on bullet-resistant armour, actioning weapons and orientating themselves with the situation and surrounding environs.
Police officers do not just jump out of the car, prepared to respond to an incident, he said.
“To drive up and not be armed or have your personal protection would be fraught with danger.”
What frontline staff did on arrival also depended on the circumstances, the expert said.
If AOS staff were just minutes away from the scene, frontline officers would be best to wait for those with more training on entering high-risk scenes.
Any clearance and evacuation would also take some time.
The tragedy involved a “heavily armed, motivated offender” who killed 51 people and injured many others across two locations within 20 minutes, the officer said.
It was “internationally unprecedented” and although the police response was not flawless, it was effective and “very likely saved many lives”.
The inquest, in the High Court at Christchurch before Coroner Brigitte Windley, will examine the following 10 issues over seven weeks:
Events of March 15, 2019, from the start of the attack until the terrorist’s formal interview by police
Response times and entry processes of police and ambulance officers at each mosque
Triage and medical response at each mosque
The steps that were taken to apprehend the offender
The role of, and processes undertaken by, Christchurch Hospital in responding to the attack
Co-ordination between emergency services and first responders
Whether the terrorist had any direct assistance from any other person on March 15, 2019
If raised by immediate family, and to the extent it can be ascertained, the final movements and time of death for each of the deceased
The cause of death for each of the victims and whether any deaths could have been avoided
Whether Al Noor Mosque emergency exit door in the southeast corner of the main prayer room had failed to function during the attack and, if so, why?
