A senior police officer only discovered people badly injured in the terror attack at Christchurch’s Al Noor Mosque were left alone in the building days or weeks afterwards, an inquest has heard.
The policeman, who cannot be named, was responsible for co-ordinating officers arriving at the scene of the 2019 mass shooting that left 51 people dead.
They reassured worshippers who survived the Al Noor attack more help was on the way, but it was another 10 minutes before any other police officers, along with paramedics, went back inside.
But today, the policeman said he was never told to replace the AOS members leaving for Linwood.
He said he would have suggested the team stay and reassure the injured until paramedics arrived to treat them.
The police officer said there had never been a debrief about the victims being left alone at Al Noor Mosque.
Family lawyer Anne Toohey questioned the officer about the presence of just three AOS members at the mosque once the rest had left for Linwood.
“I’ve driven home and seen more police at a traffic incident than that. Did this, at the time, seem incredibly thin on the ground to you in terms of a police presence at what must have been New Zealand’s worst crime scene?”
The policeman said he was assured by the AOS there were enough staff to maintain control outside and reassure and monitor victims.
He conceded communication on the day was problematic and information was not relayed as it should have been.
The senior officer, who had been with the police for more than 30 years, said he had not had training for a mass casualty event.
The inquest will examine the following 10 issues over six weeks:
The events of March 15, 2019 from the commencement of the attack until the terrorist’s formal interview by police;
Response times and entry processes of police and ambulance officers at each mosque;
Triage and medical response at each mosque;
The steps that were taken to apprehend the offender;
The role of, and processes undertaken by, Christchurch Hospital in responding to the attack;
Coordination between emergency services and first responders;
Whether the terrorist had any direct assistance from any other person on March 15, 2019;
If raised by immediate family, and to the extent it can be ascertained, the final movements and time of death for each of the deceased;
The cause of death for each of the victims and whether any deaths could have been avoided;
Whether Al Noor Mosque emergency exit door in the southeast corner of the main prayer room failed to function during the attack and, if so, why?
