OPINION:
More than two years since the terrorist attacks against the Muslim community in Riccarton and Linwood in 2019, the greatest risk of extremist violence in New Zealand, as elsewhere, comes from lone actors. It is very likely that the next perpetrator of an extremist attack, like the Christchurch terrorist, will have had little or no interaction with likeminded individuals offline. While scholars of radicalisation previously emphasised the importance of extremist groups and the role of face-to-face interaction, that perspective is now outdated. The perpetrators of recent carnage in Christchurch, El Paso, Escondido and Poway, Quebec, Halle, Hanau, Pittsburgh, Trollhattan, Lafayette, Oregon, Santa Barbara, Atlanta, all radicalised and acted alone, unaffiliated with extremist groups. Such individual attacks are just as planned and lethal as those carried out by groups.
This does not mean that these individuals are not part of and influenced by a much larger transnational movement. But it is important to emphasise the difference between individuals radicalising online and engaging in terrorism alone, and those who meet offline and act as part of a group. It is crucial for security professionals and (less importantly for) scholars to know how and where people are radicalising, what might push them towards violence, and where and how they might "leak" their intentions. Knowing where the greatest threat comes from allows scarce security resources to be more effectively targeted. Unfortunately, the task for security agencies is much more difficult than simply focusing on extremist groups that often actively seek attention through websites, podcasts and social media.
There are several reasons why lone actors radicalising online pose a greater risk than those in more visible extremist groups. As mentioned, groups of extremists are easier to monitor: by contrast, potential terrorists online, even those who talk about violence, are almost imperceptible in a constellation of hate and bravado. Many deliberately hide their plans: the Christchurch terrorist, unconnected to any extremist group aside from sporadic social media posts, largely disappeared for two years before his attacks. There is a danger that other individuals may copy this withdrawn preparation, just as perpetrators copy the tactics, targets and other repertoires of past attacks. This active attempt to remain undetected is clearly not new: in the manifesto he released before his 2011 attack, Anders Breivik provided explicit advice on remaining patient during the preparation period.