Chris Hipkins also expressed concern New Zealand was potentially “picking one side” – the side of New Zealand’s liberal democratic allies and partners – over China.
This is indicated by the Government’s decision to explore opportunities around things like Aukus Pillar 2 – an agreement between Canberra, Washington and Great Britain to share the most advanced emerging technologies.
Clark believes New Zealand’s openness strikes at our so-called “independent foreign policy”. Our politicians must be cautious to “keep their nerve” and not be “drawn into geopolitical games driven from elsewhere”.
As I’ve detailed elsewhere – what we are seeing out of the Luxon Government is actually a continuation of a trend going back to the John Key Government in 2010 to improve New Zealand’s relationships with traditional partners.
Jacinda Ardern did this, as did the Hipkins Government last year – indeed, Hipkins and his then-Minister of Defence Andrew Little signalled interest more than once in exploring Aukus Pillar 2.
So, why is this happening? As the Hipkins Government said last year through the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement, “Our region is now a strategic theatre”. Our inaugural National Security Strategy released at the same time was also revealing.
Collectively, they read like an urgent call to New Zealanders to realise things are far from stable internationally, and that we are not in a great position to weather it, especially with our military forces underfunded and in a state of disrepair.
Our Governments’ concern stems from the fact the global security environment is seeing a deepening strategic competition between the US, its allies and partners on one side, and China, Russia, Iran and North Korea on the other.
Indeed, just days ago it was revealed China was providing material support for Russia’s industrial base to assist Moscow’s war in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the US is deepening its security alliances and forging new agreements throughout the broader Pacific region. As I write, US President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida are announcing the most significant upgrade to their alliance in decades.
This is in response to the emerging Russia-China alliance, China’s massive naval and nuclear build-up, Beijing’s militarisation of the South China Sea (placing it at odds with the territorial claims there of the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia), repeated threats towards Taiwan and daily intimidation of the Philippines.
But wait – there’s more! New Zealand has been subjected to foreign interference by China in recent years. Bernard Hickey has detailed this, showing it reached into senior levels of our Government; Anne-Marie Brady has written extensively about it – and has been harassed and threatened for it – and just the other day New Zealand’s intelligence services said a group backed by the Chinese state targeted New Zealand government services in a cyber attack in 2021.
As such, New Zealand’s Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman said last year the “strategic environment has deteriorated more quickly than we imagined” and that our recent defence policy was “appropriate for a more benign world” that no longer existed.
Here we turn to the South Pacific – our immediate region. Both the Ardern and Hipkins Governments expressed concern over China’s effort to expand its security influence in the region at New Zealand’s expense, and warned that Beijing is seeking to establish a military base.
The above is just a little bit of the geopolitical game Clark is referring to. It’s not one New Zealand welcomes – far from it – but it’s one we now confront.
In short – Ardern, Hipkins and now Luxon were – and are – all responding to a deteriorating global and regional strategic environment.
In this context it’s probably good to remain close – perhaps even shift closer – to those nations with which we have a common history, values and that share our security concerns. The states, in other words, we can most rely on.
It’s also prudent to at least consider joining an expanding Aukus Pillar 2 arrangement given the immense potential benefit those technologies could provide to our economy, society and military.
As to our “independence” – an idea that means different things to different people – I think Emeritus Professor Roberto Rabel of Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies puts it well: “If independence for New Zealand means being able to disagree with ‘traditional partners’ but does not also mean freely choosing to align with them at times to pursue mutual interests, then it means little.”
Dr Reuben Steff is a Senior Lecturer in the Political Science and Public Policy Programme at the University of Waikato.