John Keegan: Intelligence In War

Reviewed by STAN PINNEGAR

This enthralling book seeks to answer one question: how useful is intelligence in war?

Its value would seem obvious to many readers, and the introduction points out that shelves groan under the weight of books on the German Enigma machine, on the British code and cipher school at Bletchley Park that attacked Enigma and the American unlocking of the Japanese ciphers, on the agents who risked their lives to find out what the enemy was up to ...

Whatever the amount of factual literature on the subject, author Keegan observes, it is exceeded in bulk by that of fiction. The subject provides a fertile ground for the scores of spy writers who have made a living and more by feeding our desire for such intrigue.

But is the usefulness of intelligence quite as obvious as we might believe?

"No war can be conducted successfully without early and good intelligence," wrote the Duke of Marlborough.

From earliest times, military leaders have sought information of an enemy's strengths and weaknesses. The book mentions the intelligence gathering of leaders such as Alexander the Great, who as a boy questioned visitors from the lands he would one day conquer on the size of their populations, rivers and towns.

The Mongols almost alone preferred terror and duplicity to win battles.

Caesar, the book notes, did not invent the Roman system of intelligence. His defeat of Gaul was as much the result of superior intelligence gathering as it was superior fighting power.

Roman intelligence evolved over several hundred years of military experience.

Spying was commonplace in the 100 Years War between France and England. By the mid-14th century there were extensive networks of English agents in northern France and the Netherlands. Spies of the time were heavily hampered by bad roads, problems hiring horses, and the sea. Wouldn't they have just loved the internet?

The chapter Chasing Napoleon covers the problems faced by the British, whose only ally was tiny Portugal, in a sea of at best haphazard intelligence, and the impotence of frigates or "scout ships".

Then there was the age-old problem of getting your message across. In 1782 Admiral Howe, in command of the Channel Fleet, issued a codebook which allowed a commander to say 999 different things with three flags, and 9999 with four.

From Napoleon and Nelson, the book moves on to Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, and to Wireless Intelligence, the Battle of Crete, the Enigma machine, the Battle of the Atlantic and concludes with "The value of military intelligence".

The simple, narrative style makes Intelligence in War powerful and hard to put down. And if you ever wanted to be a spy or to write a spy novel, you will love this book.

* Published by Hutchinson London

(Random House NZ) $79.95