Local Government Minister Simeon Brown’s intention to appoint a Crown Observer to Wellington City Council reflects mounting frustration with the capital’s governance. Whileintervention may provide temporary relief, it highlights deeper structural problems that require more fundamental reform.
Over many years the council has neglected its water and wastewater, preferring to spend money on things like a new convention centre, library, town hall, civic square, and cycleways.
It is closing in on its debt limits, so the council opted to front-load almost all the costs onto current ratepayers rather than using debt to fund long-term water assets. The Department of Internal Affairs thinks the council’s approach will overcharge Wellington City residents by more than $700 million over 10 years.
Making matters worse was a backdrop of councillors walking out of meetings, refusing to participate in votes, and engaging in public spats with colleagues and staff. Such behaviour hardly inspires confidence in the council. Hence, Finance Minister Nicola Willis described the council as a “shambles”.
Wellington Mayor Tory Whanau. Photo / Mark Mitchell
Appointing a Crown Observer is understandable under the circumstances. However, it is an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. The underlying problem is not unique to Wellington – it stems from systemic weaknesses in New Zealand’s local government model.
Our councils operate under a governance structure where mayors lack the formal powers to deliver on their mandates despite being directly elected leaders. Real administrative authority rests with unelected council chief executives, while mayors must constantly wrangle support from councillors who may have conflicting priorities or indulge in petty political games.
Nobody is clearly in charge or responsible when power is divided between mayors, chief executives, and councillors. It creates the perfect condition for dysfunction. Problems fester unaddressed.
Given the harsh criticism of Wellington’s Mayor Tory Whanau, it might seem counterintuitive to suggest strengthening mayoral powers as a solution.
However, such a model has been successfully used internationally. Many cities have mayors with much stronger powers over budgets, appointments, and strategic direction, matched with more transparent accountability for results.
In fact, the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia once faced the same problem as New Zealand’s – and successfully resolved it.
The German state and New Zealand inherited a local government system from Britain, under which unelected chief executives hold significant power, leaving mayors struggling to implement their mandates and councillors impeded from holding their councils to account.
Recognising these issues, the state parliament voted for sweeping reforms. It transferred executive powers from chief executives to elected majors.
The first directly elected mayors with executive powers took office in 1999. Consolidating political and administrative power brought efficiency and accountability.
It empowered mayors to implement their mandates effectively whilst maintaining democratic checks and balances, including through council authorisation and oversight, direct democracy and recall elections.
Crucially, the reforms clarified lines of responsibility, making it easier for citizens to understand who was accountable for council decisions. Twenty-five years later, there is no appetite for a return to the old system.
In New Zealand, the legislation which established the Auckland Super City provided a mayoral office with staff accountable to the mayor rather than the chief executive. While not as strong a model as North Rhine-Westphalia’s, the role of Auckland’s mayor is stronger than any other in New Zealand. Recently, it has given Wayne Brown a strong platform to drive cost savings.
Critics worry that providing more power could enable incompetent or dictatorial mayors to wreak havoc. However, international evidence suggests that greater responsibility attracts more qualified candidates, while clearer accountability makes it harder for poor performers to deflect blame.
Moreover, appropriate checks and balances can be built in. These include council authorisation and oversight of major decisions, professional management of day-to-day operations, and voter recall provisions for truly problematic mayors.
The transition to a strong mayoral model need not be abrupt or uniform. A staged approach could begin with larger cities before extending voluntarily to smaller councils. This would allow the system to be refined based on local experience while maintaining flexibility.
Wellington’s woes illustrate how the current system’s weak mayoral model can cause major problems.
Think for a moment about what might have happened in an alternative universe. A high calibre candidate is attracted by having the ability to get things done. When elected, they use their clear mandate and well-honed political and managerial skills to push a focus on the basics, reducing spending on ‘nice-to-haves’, and keeping debt under control.
The mayor is a strong advocate for the city, attracting jobs and investment, and has the respect of central government. The city is prospering and there is no intervention.
This may seem a fantasy from where we are now, but it is much more likely under a strong mayor model.
It is time to treat the underlying condition. Intervention might help navigate Wellington’s immediate difficulties, but lasting improvement requires a new approach.
