Between the lines: Military relationships mean a better class of friendship

By JIM EAGLES

Whether the Government's new defence policy will prove an adequate basis for protecting New Zealand and its vital interests from any military threats is a question which, hopefully, will never have to be answered.

But whether it will serve to maintain the subtle network of friendships and favours that enables New Zealand to promote its economic interests is a question which will, almost certainly, be answered in the near future.

The answer will not come openly in the form of a forthright statement from the Australian Government, for example, that it will not use its full muscle to get the states to open their markets for New Zealand apples. Rather, it will emerge over time in the form of many requests never quite processed, policies quietly put on the back-burner and international interests pushed less than wholeheartedly.

The simple reality is that countries, like people, are prepared to do more for their good friends than they are for mere acquaintances.

A Government may not come out and say, "Why should I do anything for you? What have you ever done for us?" But that is how they act, nevertheless. And when it comes to deciding on friendship, military matters are crucial.

In Asia, where most of the leaders have come up via a military route, defence partnerships are the best way to earn respect, and the United States has long had a complicated system for ranking its friends, based primarily on perceived reliability.

Most important of all, the Anzac relationship, forged on the battlefields at Gallipoli, still depends very much on military cooperation.

When, for instance, it was necessary to keep the CER negotiations on track in the face of the Anzus row, the previous Labour Government did so by buying Anzac frigates, although other vessels would have been better value.

More recently, in the absence of any such gesture, Australian irritation at the present Government's approach to defence forced New Zealand to give away access to welfare benefits and citizenship.

None of those developments was publicly linked to a cooling of the transtasman defence relationship, but those involved knew exactly what was going on.

So what is likely to be the reaction in Asia and the US to the decision to transform our armed forces from the traditional military capability to a peacemaking one?

In particular, what will the Australians feel about the decision to axe the RNZAF's fighter wing, leaving a big hole in Australia's air defences?

The Australian Government has been punctilious in not criticising the new policy and declaring it to be a matter for New Zealand. But the real reaction will come when New Zealand needs a favour, maybe over access for lamb to the US, possibly over our wish to be part of a US-Australia-Singapore trade deal.

If we are unaccountably overlooked when the seats at the top table are allocated and our representatives have to lurk hopefully in the corners, we will all know why.