One of its ideas is that mayors could be
given access to independent staff advice, separate from their chief executives and council staff.
Briefly floated in Simeon Brown’s recent speech to Local Government New Zealand, the intent appears to be to extend the Auckland mayoral model to the rest of New Zealand. With Auckland’s mayoral staff directly accountable to the mayor rather than the chief executive, it is a variation from the traditional structure of council governance.
The Minister’s rationale is to ensure that the voices of communities, represented by their elected mayors, are heard more effectively within the machinery of local government.
Currently, administrative power is in the hands of council chief executives with their staff having a strong information advantage over elected representatives. Mayors, while serving as the public face of councils and chairing meetings, often lack meaningful influence over council operations.
This split between governance and management is deliberate but can lead to complaints about inadequate democratic oversight and sometimes conflict between elected representatives and chief executives. Usually, tensions play out behind the scenes, but Gore District had a public blow-up in 2023.
Auckland’s mayoral model seems effective. Auckland’s Watercare charges for water separately, making rates comparisons with other councils difficult to assess. However, Mayor Wayne Brown this year drove cost savings that enabled Auckland to impose a 6.8% rates increase, much smaller than the 14% average of other councils.
Would it work elsewhere?
Overseas experience suggests it could. An interesting comparison can be drawn with the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW).
In 1999, NRW implemented a major reform of its local government structure. Prior to this, its municipalities operated under a dual leadership system, with a Bürgermeister (mayor) serving as political representative and an Oberstadtdirektor (chief executive) managing day-to-day operations. If this seems familiar, it is what we have in New Zealand. In an historical quirk it was imposed in British-occupied Germany after World War II.
The reforms came after growing dissatisfaction with the dual system, concerns that might feel familiar here. It was criticised for creating inefficiencies and slowing decision-making processes; lack of clarity of who was responsible for council decisions; political tensions between mayors and chief executives; and voters being unable to hold powerful chief executives to account.
Other German states had also moved to having ‘strong’ mayors. So, NRW abolished the position of Oberstadtdirektor, combining the roles of political representative and administrative head into a single, directly elected mayoral position. Citizens petitions and referendums were also enabled. The reforms streamlined decision-making processes, improved accountability, enhanced democratic participation, and provided stronger local leadership.
As with any major reforms there were implementation challenges, but these were managed by having a long transition period. There was training and development for elected representatives and staff, public information campaigns, and monitoring and evaluation.
Back in New Zealand, the Minister’s idea for independent mayoral staff would be a more cautious step towards mayoral empowerment. While seeking to provide mayors with greater access to information and advice, it would not fundamentally alter the structure of council leadership.
Auckland’s mayoral office seems to work well, but effectiveness elsewhere would vary depending on size and complexity of councils. In larger cities, independent mayoral staff could provide valuable support navigating complex issues, dealing with the bureaucracy, and engaging with communities. In smaller councils, however, the addition of another layer of advisors might be too expensive. By putting mayors directly in charge, the NRW reform would avoid this problem.
Another option might be to give mayors and councillors the powers and duties of company directors. This could give elected representatives a stronger influence on council operations than allowed for under the Local Government Act, where chief executives appear to have more control and discretion.
More immediately, councillors need improved access to information and for it to be timely and user-friendly.
Whether or not mayoral powers should be strengthened depends on broader conceptions of the nature of local democracy.
Should mayors, as elected representatives, have more direct control over council operations to advance their policies? Might a higher calibre of mayoral candidates be attracted if mayors were more empowered?
Or would it weaken checks on political interference and risk giving too much power to low calibre mayors? And would more powers for mayors do much to resolve political dysfunction when mayors struggle to get support from majorities of councillors?
And should any reforms be system-wide, implemented across all councils, or be voluntary for councils to decide on the best way forward?
These are not easy questions to answer. NRW’s experience suggests empowering mayors can lead to more cohesive and accountable local governance. However, it also represents a significant departure from New Zealand’s current system and would likely be resisted by a powerful professional managerial class.
But if empowering mayors led to more responsive, efficient, and democratically accountable local governance, then it could be a positive evolution in our local government landscape.
