THE tragic - yet in some ways magnificent - recent case of Lecretia Seales has well and truly pushed the envelope of the judicial agenda on assisted suicide. Lecretia challenged us to further explore contentious issues that cut to the very nub of boundaries between personal choice and collective responsibility.
It is interesting that some of the debate has been couched in the context of justice. With her own considerable expertise in the profession, Lecretia argued that current legislation proscribing assisted suicide abnegated her rights as defined by the Bill of Rights Act. Of course the problem here is that any health professional assisting the suicide would be culpable under the Crimes Act.
But justice is a highly elusive concept in adjudicating the complexity of euthanasia issues - matters perhaps more in the moral and/or ethical domain. Legislating in these areas involves traversing a veritable minefield of competing interests - a terrain that Justice Collins chose to sidestep altogether. The devil, as they say, is in the detail - and what devilish details there are.
Take what is presently referred to as The Dutch Debate.
The Netherlands was the first country to legalise euthanasia, coming into effect in 2002. Many conditions have to be met in order to qualify: the patient must repeatedly ask to die; two doctors have to agree in writing that euthanasia is justified; and a post-mortem panel of a doctor, a jurist and an ethical expert have to confirm all legal requirements are met. Although the 2002 law allowed that advanced psychological pain could justify euthanasia, its main thrust was as a response to extreme physical duress.