Opinion: Step by unwavering step since taking office, the coalition government has dragged New Zealand closer to the United States. There was the early kerfuffle about Aukus, when Foreign Minister Winston Peters neither confirmed nor denied New Zealand’s enthusiasm for signing up to non-nuclear aspects of the security pact involving Australia, the UK and the US. (Collision Crossroads, Listener, January 13). There was the agreement to join the US-led alliance against Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, which drew criticism from former prime minister Helen Clark (Into troubled waters, Listener, February 17).
Fast forward to July and the Nato summit in Washington, where our officials reiterated their commitment to the Cold War Anzus alliance, subsequently echoed by Prime Minister Christopher Luxon in a speech at the Lowy Institute in Sydney.
Washington effectively cut New Zealand adrift from Anzus in the mid-1980s after Wellington refused to accept US nuclear ships in our ports. The nuclear-free policy grew out of resistance to French nuclear tests in the South Pacific and exemplified the independent status the country has maintained for 40 years. Small nations with little political agency rely on international law for their security, and depend upon the UN and forums such as the World Trade Organisation to uphold their rights.
If New Zealand were to rejoin Anzus, let alone join Aukus (whether pillar I or pillar II of the agreement, it is the same nuclear and military alliance), it would effectively mortgage its sovereignty for an illusion of security, just as Canberra has done over the past 15 years. Pillar II of Aukus provides for sharing of advanced technology between the partners, potentially including AI and hypersonic weaponry, and is squarely aimed at deterring China. Pillar I provides Australia with eight nuclear-powered (but not nuclear-armed) submarines.
New Zealand would risk losing the respect it has earned in the region over decades for its courage to negotiate important issues between historical allies and trading partners as they arose, guided by the principle of modest independence, not selfish neutrality.
The irony is that Aukus is unlikely to survive in its currently agreed form, with future costs its signatories cannot afford, and deliverables (such as the Virginia-class nuclear submarines) that will not be commissioned for another generation, by which time they will likely be obsolete.
High economic price
Some NZ ministers appear to be seeking reflected power from Washington and Canberra, unaware that in exchange for this ephemera they will have to front the US’s containment of China, absorb Beijing’s ire, and pay a high economic price.
It is hard for any in government interacting with our larger partners to manage the intense pressure placed on them. New Zealand’s leaders nevertheless appear to be acquiescing to a cohort within the Wellington bureaucracy that have long determined to disengage from China and narrow relations to focus on our former Western allies. Perhaps these bureaucrats hope to recover an aura of colonial moral and cultural superiority, or prefer dealing with cultures more like their own.
A political adage misattributed to Henry Kissinger maintained that “the US does not have permanent allies, only interests”. New Zealand should consider what it has to gain by becoming a passing interest to Washington. No US president since Nixon has hosted a state banquet for a NZ prime minister, or discussed a free trade agreement comprehensively. Small Asia-Pacific nations should be wary of grasping at the shadows of past alliances out of fear of a bewildering present, or an uncertain future.
Most Southeast Asian countries understand this, informed by their experiences pushing out colonial powers and rebuilding their nations, while maintaining equanimous relationships with countries often in dispute with each other.
Few want the US to leave the region entirely, preferring a responsible counterpoint to the power of China, but creating a balance rather than taking sides in a struggle for hegemony.
The US is forcing countries to take sides in its struggle to retain its influence in Asia, relying on its ability to weaponise the dollar, manipulate global trade and demonstrate its unparalleled military power.
But to exert power without providing true economic value is to do little more than engage in an expensive dumb show. Militarily weaker than the US, China is the major economic influence in Asia. Beyond defending scattered maritime outposts of questionable value, China has little to gain by infringing on the sovereignty of its vital trading partners in the region.
American influence will continue to wane in Asia to the extent that the US continues to look inwards and will struggle to justify or afford to project its influence across the far corners of the world. Nations that ally themselves with Washington will likely find themselves waning with it.
Those such as New Zealand and Australia, which can hopefully acknowledge they are Asia-Pacific countries with economies rooted within this region, will prosper and be better able to deal with a changing world that will in any case include an increasingly powerful China within it.
Risky rhetoric
If New Zealand were to join pillar II of Aukus, Beijing might not embargo Kiwi products immediately as it did Australian barley, wine, seafood and beef three years ago. New Zealand has maintained a respectful, frank dialogue with China for 50 years, and Beijing understands the nature of coalition governments and short election cycles.
Joining Aukus would, however, send a signal that New Zealand sees the world the way Washington does, which is that China is an existential enemy that must, at best, be contained.
A great deal depends on what Luxon says in public in the coming months. If he persists with his current rhetoric – which closely matches that of Canberra and Washington – Beijing might well re-assess its relationship with New Zealand.
While some commentators have argued China should not use trade as a means to punish New Zealand, it could be asked why China should offer friendly trading terms with those that treat it as an enemy.
New Zealand also risks destroying 50 years of its hard-won, non-allied status. Through a period of great upheaval, New Zealand followed the principles of international law rather than the whims of its historical allies.
The same allies violated these principles at times, which forced New Zealand to make choices such as refusing to join the US invasion of Iraq. Similarly, we decided to register firm protests against Beijing’s actions that we saw as unjust, such as increased restrictions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.
New Zealand companies with business interests in China are rightly concerned, should Wellington stay its present course. The government has not asked the New Zealand business community or the public what they want. The independent path for New Zealand is not kowtowing to China, but it is likewise not joining the US and its allies in shaking their sabres at it.
Expat Kiwi David Mahon is founder and chair of Mahon China Investment Management and has lived in Beijing for 40 years. Chinese New Zealander Charlie Gao lives in Auckland and is group general manager of Mastip Technology Ltd.
