The National Security Strategy is the first document of this kind to be released in New Zealand. Previously we have been rather ad-hoc about security, leaving it to various ministries and agencies to look after their various domains.
The strategy is focused on protecting New Zealanders from “those who would do us harm”. Policy language is carefully constructed, and this clearly indicates active and malicious threats to New Zealand.
It is intended as an overarching document for the security work of the entire sector. It identifies 12 core national security issues which include: 1. Strategic Competition and the Rules-based International System; 2. Emerging, critical and sensitive technologies; 3. Disinformation; 4. Foreign interference and espionage; 5. Terrorism and violent extremism; 6. Transnational organised crime; 7. Economic security; 8. Pacific resilience and security; 9. Maritime security; 10. Border security; 11. Cyber security; 12. Space security.
All 12 core issues are translated into Māori and the strategy notes that everyone in New Zealand is welcomed to gather under our korowai manaaki of national security. The attempt at a Tiriti-led approach to the strategy is a first and a welcome presentation of who we are as people in New Zealand.
I can also personally attest to the length of time taken to develop these documents and that policy makers have consulted widely across the public and academia, including with Massey’s defence and security students.
While many of the security issues listed will be known and understood, it’s interesting to see threats being found within technology, our economy and space. The emergence of foreign interference and return of espionage brings about images of cold war spy games, but suggests that New Zealand is not immune from influence operations, intellectual property theft and individuals being manipulated by other nation states for malicious purpose.
This is definitely not the New Zealand I grew up in. The world has changed and the state is letting us know.
In terms of the Defence Policy and Strategy document, there is a clear picture of a world where war has returned and that the international rules-based order has been disregarded by Russia in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. That Russia seems intent on continuing that war is opening broader possibilities of conflict with the Nato alliance, which is certainly rearming.
Likewise, the increasing military capability of China seems aimed at exerting power in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and an invasion of Taiwan. For China to do that effectively it must reduce the United States and its allies’ ability to respond.
Our defence policy is focused on the NZDF being increasingly combat capable, interoperable with our military ally Australia, and playing an increasingly supportive role in the Pacific.
There are challenges. The NZDF has lost so many staff because of the Managed Isolation and Quarantine (MIQ) deployments and a tight labour market. As we saw in Cyclone Gabrielle, it can’t deploy all its current capabilities at full effect. Military hardware is extremely expensive and in a political environment where our health and education sectors are struggling and the cost of living is increasing, funding a Defence Force may be seen as a luxury for some.
What is clear is that New Zealand’s modest military capacity is stretched (which is a threat in itself) and it is now for the first time in a long time possibly needed to prepare for securing our borders, maritime domain and protecting the Pacific in a more assertive manner.
■ Associate Professor William Hoverd is the director of Massey’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies.
